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Single Idea 15783

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects ]

Full Idea

Meinong characteristically refers to his Objects using definite descriptions, such as 'the golden mountain'. But on his view there are many golden mountains, with different features. How can 'the golden mountain' then succeed in denoting a single Object?

Gist of Idea

Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist

Source

comment on Willard Quine (works [1961]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 01

Book Ref

'The Possible and the Actual', ed/tr. Loux,Michael J. [Cornell 1979], p.277

A Reaction

Use of definite descriptions doesn't seem obligatory in this situation. 'Think of a golden mountain' - 'which one?' - 'never mind which one!'.

The 17 ideas with the same theme [status of 'objects' that can't actually exist]:

10945 Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are' [Aristotle]
7756 Meinong said all objects of thought (even self-contradictions) have some sort of being [Meinong, by Lycan]
15781 The objects of knowledge are far more numerous than objects which exist [Meinong]
21531 Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true [Lackey on Russell]
21545 I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell]
21547 On Meinong's principles 'the existent round square' has to exist [Russell]
18777 If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell]
15783 Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan on Quine]
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
18948 There is an object for every set of properties (some of which exist, and others don't) [Parsons,T, by Sawyer]
14617 Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker]
15792 Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
18852 A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen]
14392 Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks]
12448 Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni]
18766 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA]
18768 We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA]