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Single Idea 18948

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects ]

Full Idea

According to Terence Parsons, there is an object corresponding to every set of properties. To some of those sets of properties there corresponds an object that exists, and to others there corresponds an object that does not exist (a nonexistent object).

Gist of Idea

There is an object for every set of properties (some of which exist, and others don't)

Source

report of Terence Parsons (Nonexistent Objects [1980]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 5

Book Ref

'Routledge Companion to Phil of Language', ed/tr. Russell/Graff Faria [Routledge 2015], p.160

A Reaction

This I take to be the main source of the modern revival of Meinong's notorious view of objects (attacked by Russell). I always find the thought 'a round square is square' to be true, and in need of a truthmaker. But must a round square be non-triangular?

The 17 ideas with the same theme [status of 'objects' that can't actually exist]:

10945 Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are' [Aristotle]
7756 Meinong said all objects of thought (even self-contradictions) have some sort of being [Meinong, by Lycan]
15781 The objects of knowledge are far more numerous than objects which exist [Meinong]
21531 Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true [Lackey on Russell]
21545 I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell]
21547 On Meinong's principles 'the existent round square' has to exist [Russell]
18777 If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell]
15783 Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan on Quine]
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
18948 There is an object for every set of properties (some of which exist, and others don't) [Parsons,T, by Sawyer]
14617 Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker]
15792 Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
18852 A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen]
14392 Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks]
12448 Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni]
18766 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA]
18768 We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA]