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Single Idea 13933
[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
]
Full Idea
We distinguish two kinds of existence questions: first, entities of a new kind within the framework; we call them 'internal questions'. Second, 'external questions', concerning the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole.
Gist of Idea
Existence questions are 'internal' (within a framework) or 'external' (concerning the whole framework)
Source
Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950], 2)
Book Ref
Carnap,Rudolph: 'Meaning and Necessity (2nd ed)' [Chicago 1988], p.206
A Reaction
This nicely disposes of many ontological difficulties, but at the price of labelling most external questions as meaningless, so that the internal answers have very little commitment, and the external (big) questions are now banned. Not for me.
Related Idea
Idea 12217
For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K]
The
20 ideas
from Rudolph Carnap
16252
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Metaphysics uses empty words, or just produces pseudo-statements
[Carnap]
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8748
|
Logical positivists incorporated geometry into logicism, saying axioms are just definitions
[Carnap, by Shapiro]
|
8960
|
Internal questions about abstractions are trivial, and external ones deeply problematic
[Carnap, by Szabó]
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13932
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Empiricists tend to reject abstract entities, and to feel sympathy with nominalism
[Carnap]
|
13935
|
We only accept 'things' within a language with formation, testing and acceptance rules
[Carnap]
|
13933
|
Existence questions are 'internal' (within a framework) or 'external' (concerning the whole framework)
[Carnap]
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13934
|
To be 'real' is to be an element of a system, so we cannot ask reality questions about the system itself
[Carnap]
|
13936
|
Questions about numbers are answered by analysis, and are analytic, and hence logically true
[Carnap]
|
13937
|
New linguistic claims about entities are not true or false, but just expedient, fruitful or successful
[Carnap]
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13938
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A linguistic framework involves commitment to entities, so only commitment to the framework is in question
[Carnap]
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13939
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No possible evidence could decide the reality of numbers, so it is a pseudo-question
[Carnap]
|
13940
|
All linguistic forms in science are merely judged by their efficiency as instruments
[Carnap]
|
13048
|
Good explications are exact, fruitful, simple and similar to the explicandum
[Carnap, by Salmon]
|
12131
|
All concepts can be derived from a few basics, making possible one science of everything
[Carnap, by Brody]
|
18699
|
Carnap tried to define all scientific predicates in terms of primitive relations, using type theory
[Carnap, by Button]
|
13251
|
Each person is free to build their own logic, just by specifying a syntax
[Carnap]
|
13342
|
Carnap defined consequence by contradiction, but this is unintuitive and changes with substitution
[Tarski on Carnap]
|
11968
|
The intension of a sentence is the set of all possible worlds in which it is true
[Carnap, by Kaplan]
|
14305
|
In the truth-functional account a burnt-up match was soluble because it never entered water
[Carnap]
|
18285
|
All translation loses some content (but language does not create reality)
[Carnap]
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