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Single Idea 4371

[filed under theme 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason ]

Full Idea

For Aristotle, practical perception is perception of particulars as parts of larger wholes, which involves the perception of their value (as in seeing my food as part of bodily health, and all action as part of a flourishing life).

Gist of Idea

Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value

Source

comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Deborah Achtenberg - Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics Intro

Book Ref

Achtenberg,Deborah: 'Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics' [SUNY 2002], p.9


A Reaction

An appealing idea. Hume (who separates facts from values) would call it rubbish, but with the addition of a premiss like "life is good", this seems plausible and appealing.


The 31 ideas with the same theme [reasoning processes that lead to action]:

For Socrates, wisdom and prudence were the same thing [Socrates, by Xenophon]
Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
We deliberate about means, not ends [Aristotle]
Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite [Aristotle]
Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings [Aristotle]
Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct [Aristotle]
Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them [Aristotle]
One cannot be prudent without being good [Aristotle]
The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues [Aristotle]
Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle]
The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle]
Prudence is more valuable than philosophy, because it avoids confusions of the soul [Epicurus]
Reason is usually general, but deliberation is of particulars [Hobbes]
We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost [Leibniz]
For Hume, practical reason has little force, because we can always modify our desires [Hume, by Graham]
A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid]
The sole objects of practical reason are the good and the evil [Kant]
General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them [Kant]
If we were essentially intellect rather than will, our moral worth would depend on imagined motives [Schopenhauer]
Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot]
All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot]
Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality [Foot]
The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will [Davidson]
We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle]
Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham]
Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor]
'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence [Annas]
Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M]
Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M]
We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M]
Justifying reasons say you were right; excusing reasons say your act was explicable [Goldie]