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Single Idea 1317

[filed under theme 16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations ]

Full Idea

I affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and movement.

Gist of Idea

A person is just a fast-moving bundle of perceptions

Source

David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6)

Book Ref

'Personal Identity', ed/tr. Perry,John [University of California 1975], p.162


A Reaction

Note that Hume is not just saying what we can know of ourselves, but is asserting a view of what we actually are. The minimal objection to this is to ask how we know that a perception is a member of one big bundle rather than several small ones.


The 13 ideas with the same theme [Self is a unity formed by associating mental events]:

Hume's 'bundle' won't distinguish one mind with ten experiences from ten minds [Searle on Hume]
A person is just a fast-moving bundle of perceptions [Hume]
The parts of a person are always linked together by causation [Hume]
Hume gives us an interesting sketchy causal theory of personal identity [Perry on Hume]
A person is simply a bundle of continually fluctuating perceptions [Hume]
Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume]
Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer]
Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer]
If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer]
The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle]
Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin]
Can the mental elements of a 'bundle' exist on their own? [Carruthers]
Why would a thought be a member of one bundle rather than another? [Carruthers]