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Single Idea 5325

[filed under theme 16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations ]

Full Idea

Is the character of being an item of experience one that can accrue to a quale through its relation to other qualia, or must it consist in a relation to a subject, which is conscious of these elements and distinct from them?

Clarification

A 'quale' is a raw feeling, such as the redness of red

Gist of Idea

Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject?

Source

A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.B)

Book Ref

Ayer,A.J.: 'The Central Questions of Philosophy' [Penguin 1976], p.118


A Reaction

When nicely put like this, it is hard to see how qualia could be experiences just because they relate to one another. It begs the question of what is causing the relationship. There seems to be a Cogito-like assumption of a thinker.


The 13 ideas from 'The Central Questions of Philosophy'

Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer]
Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer]
Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer]
Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer]
Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer]
Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer]
Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer]
Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer]
You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer]
The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer]
We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer]
It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer]
Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer]