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Full Idea
It is not clear how the emotivist can accommodate the amoralist - one who recognises moral requirements but is indifferent to them.
Gist of Idea
How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it?
Source
David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224)
Book Ref
'Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy', ed/tr. Audi,Robert [CUP 1995], p.224
A Reaction
Nietzsche recognised current morals, but was indifferent to them. It is hard to imagine, though, an amoralist who lacked all the feelings which imply morality.
| 2853 | Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink] |
| 2852 | Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink] |
| 2849 | Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink] |
| 2850 | How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink] |
| 2848 | Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink] |
| 2851 | Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink] |