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Single Idea 6070

[filed under theme 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence ]

Full Idea

Existence is like a primary quality; non-existence is like a secondary quality.

Gist of Idea

Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality

Source

Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.2 n29)

Book Ref

McGinn,Colin: 'Logical Properties' [OUP 2003], p.43

A Reaction

Since McGinn thinks existence really is a property, and hence, presumably, a predicate, I don't quite see why he uses the word "like". A nicely pithy and thought-provoking remark.

The 74 ideas from Colin McGinn

6042 The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool [McGinn]
6053 Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn]
6051 In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements [McGinn]
6055 Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation [McGinn]
6059 Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation [McGinn]
6052 Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity [McGinn]
6043 Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn]
6044 Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn]
6046 Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn]
6050 Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn]
6049 Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn]
6058 Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn]
6054 Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn]
6045 It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn]
6047 All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn]
6048 Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn]
6062 Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn]
6065 We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn]
6067 Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn]
6069 'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied [McGinn]
6068 We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition [McGinn]
6071 Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances [McGinn]
6066 Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn]
6072 If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence [McGinn]
6073 I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined [McGinn]
6064 Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation [McGinn]
6070 Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn]
6075 Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn]
6074 Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn]
6077 Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn]
6082 If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn]
6081 Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge [McGinn]
6080 Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties [McGinn]
6079 If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn]
6088 Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions [McGinn]
6083 The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn]
6084 'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn]
6085 The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn]
6086 Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn]
6087 Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn]
4690 If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind [McGinn]
4691 If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech [McGinn]
2543 Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn]
2544 Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality [McGinn]
2545 Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn]
2546 Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge [McGinn]
2547 There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood [McGinn]
2539 Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion [McGinn]
2540 Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn]
2542 Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity [McGinn]
12019 McGinn falsely claims necessity of origin is a special case of the necessity of identity [Forbes,G on McGinn]
18892 Suppose a world where I'm from different gametes; add my gametes; which one is more me? [McGinn]
7388 McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett on McGinn]
3185 Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts [McGinn]
6171 Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions [McGinn]
22413 Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn]
18410 Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn]
22417 Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn]
22412 Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn]
22414 You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn]
22415 Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn]
22416 Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn]
22418 I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn]
22420 The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn]
18402 Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn]
22422 Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn]
22423 Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn]
22426 We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn]
22421 Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn]
22424 Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn]
22425 The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn]
22427 To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn]
22428 You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn]
7629 We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn]