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Single Idea 5349
[filed under theme 16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
]
Full Idea
According to Buddhism, the idea of a permanent, constant self is an illusion, and a morally dangerous one.
Gist of Idea
For Buddhists a fixed self is a morally dangerous illusion
Source
Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p.161)
Book Ref
Flanagan,Owen: 'The Problem of the Soul' [Basic Books 2003], p.161
A Reaction
We are familiar with the idea that it might be an illusion, but I am unconvinced by 'morally dangerous'. If you drop both free will and personal identity, I can't see any sort of focus for moral life left, but I am willing to be convinced.
The
23 ideas
from 'The Problem of the Soul'
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5332
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People believe they have free will that circumvents natural law, but only an incorporeal mind could do this
[Flanagan]
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5333
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Philosophy needs wisdom about who we are, as well as how we ought to be
[Flanagan]
|
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5334
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We resist science partly because it can't provide ethical wisdom
[Flanagan]
|
|
5335
|
Emotions are usually very apt, rather than being non-rational and fickle
[Flanagan]
|
|
5336
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Ethics is the science of the conditions that lead to human flourishing
[Flanagan]
|
|
5338
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Normal free will claims control of what I do, but a stronger view claims control of thought and feeling
[Flanagan]
|
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5339
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Cars and bodies obey principles of causation, without us knowing any 'strict laws' about them
[Flanagan]
|
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5340
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Explanation does not entail prediction
[Flanagan]
|
|
5341
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Only you can have your subjective experiences because only you are hooked up to your nervous system
[Flanagan]
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5342
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Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser
[Flanagan]
|
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5343
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People largely came to believe in dualism because it made human agents free
[Flanagan]
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5344
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Free will is held to give us a whole list of desirable capacities for living
[Flanagan]
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5345
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We only think of ourselves as having free will because we first thought of God that way
[Flanagan]
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5346
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In the 17th century a collisionlike view of causation made mental causation implausible
[Flanagan]
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5347
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Behaviourism notoriously has nothing to say about mental causation
[Flanagan]
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5348
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Intellectualism admires the 'principled actor', non-intellectualism admires the 'good character'
[Flanagan]
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5349
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For Buddhists a fixed self is a morally dangerous illusion
[Flanagan]
|
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5350
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The Hindu doctrine of reincarnation only appeared in the eighth century CE
[Flanagan]
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5351
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We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same
[Flanagan]
|
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5352
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The idea of the soul gets some support from the scientific belief in essential 'natural kinds'
[Flanagan]
|
|
5353
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The self is an abstraction which magnifies important aspects of autobiography
[Flanagan]
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5354
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We are not born with a self; we develop a self through living
[Flanagan]
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5355
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Cognitivists think morals are discovered by reason
[Flanagan]
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