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Full Idea
We should revise our view about identity over time: what matters isn't that there will be someone alive who will be me; it is rather that there should be at least one living person who will be psychologically continuous with me as I am now.
Gist of Idea
Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity
Source
Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.316)
Book Ref
'Personal Identity', ed/tr. Martin,R /Barresi,J [Blackwells 2003], p.316
A Reaction
Parfit and Locke seem to agree on this, and it is no accident that they both like 'science fiction' examples. Apparently Parfit wouldn't bat an eyelid if someone threatened to cut his corpus callosum. I rate it as a catastrophe for my current existence.
| 5515 | Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit] |
| 5514 | Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit] |
| 5516 | Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG] |
| 5518 | It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit] |
| 5519 | It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit] |
| 5520 | If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit] |
| 5521 | If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit] |
| 5522 | Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit] |