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Full Idea
The modest mentalism of the Computational/Representational Theory of Thought (CRTT), associated with Fodor, says mental processes are computational, defined over syntactically specified entities, and these entities represent the world (are also semantic).
Gist of Idea
Is thought a syntactic computation using representations?
Source
report of Jerry A. Fodor (works [1986]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind Int.3
Book Ref
Rey,Georges: 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind' [Blackwell 1997], p.9
A Reaction
This seems to imply that if you built a machine that did all these things, it would become conscious, which sounds unlikely. Do footprints 'represent' feet, or does representation need prior consciousness?
| 7651 | With wonderful new machines being made, a speaking machine no longer seems impossible [La Mettrie] |
| 8056 | AI can't predict innovation, or consequences, or external relations, or external events [MacIntyre] |
| 7654 | What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett] |
| 12655 | Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor] |
| 3135 | Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey] |
| 3215 | Images can't replace computation, as they need it [Rey] |
| 3194 | CRTT is good on deduction, but not so hot on induction, abduction and practical reason [Rey] |
| 6655 | The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe] |
| 6657 | Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe] |
| 23518 | Modern AI is mostly machine-based pattern recognition [Seth] |