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Single Idea 6318

[filed under theme 19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation ]

Full Idea

Perhaps the doctrine of indeterminacy of translation will have little air of paradox for readers familiar with Wittgenstein's latter-day remarks on meaning.

Gist of Idea

The doctrine of indeterminacy of translation seems implied by the later Wittgenstein

Source

report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (The Blue and Brown Notebooks [1936], II.§16 n) by Willard Quine - Word and Object II.§16 n

Book Ref

Quine,Willard: 'Word and Object' [MIT 1969], p.77

A Reaction

This may be right, and I am inclined to link the names of Wittgenstein and Quine among those who led philosophy up a relativistic and sceptical cul-de-sac for many years. You can think too hard, you know.

The 219 ideas from Ludwig Wittgenstein

6318 The doctrine of indeterminacy of translation seems implied by the later Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Quine]
22419 'I' is a subject in 'I am in pain' and an object in 'I am bleeding' [Wittgenstein, by McGinn]
16010 While faith is a passion (as Kierkegaard says), wisdom is passionless [Wittgenstein]
18704 Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein]
18706 Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein]
18705 Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein]
18707 All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein]
18708 Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein]
18709 Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein]
18727 A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein]
18710 Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein]
18711 A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein]
18712 Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein]
18713 If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein]
18719 Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein]
18714 We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein]
18715 Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein]
18716 A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein]
18717 Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein]
18718 Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein]
18720 Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein]
18721 Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein]
18723 We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein]
18724 In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein]
18725 A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein]
18726 For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein]
18728 The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein]
18729 Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein]
18730 The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein]
18732 We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein]
18731 There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein]
18733 Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein]
18734 If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein]
18735 Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein]
18736 Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein]
18737 There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein]
18738 We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein]
18280 We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein]
6563 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
23481 Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein]
23500 My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein]
22323 The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein]
18276 A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein]
16908 We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein]
18274 Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein]
4678 Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein]
23472 The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein]
22312 Facts can be both positive and negative [Wittgenstein, by Potter]
3596 Total doubt can't even get started [Wittgenstein, by Williams,M]
4721 If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either [Wittgenstein]
3597 Foundations need not precede other beliefs [Wittgenstein]
6501 As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections [Wittgenstein, by Robinson,H]
18743 Wittgenstein says we want the grammar of problems, not their first-order logical structure [Wittgenstein, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
7055 Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Heil]
12576 Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on [Wittgenstein, by Peacocke]
23450 Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
6567 For Wittgenstein, words are defined by their use, just as chess pieces are [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
4136 To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life [Wittgenstein]
4137 In the majority of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language [Wittgenstein]
4138 Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow? [Wittgenstein]
4139 Naming is a preparation for description [Wittgenstein]
4140 The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein]
4141 Various games have a 'family resemblance', as their similarities overlap and criss-cross [Wittgenstein]
4946 A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family [Wittgenstein, by Kripke]
2512 Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language [Wittgenstein]
6566 The problem is to explain the role of contradiction in social life [Wittgenstein]
4142 To understand a sentence means to understand a language [Wittgenstein]
6165 Every course of action can either accord or conflict with a rule, so there is no accord or conflict [Wittgenstein]
4143 One cannot obey a rule 'privately', because that is a practice, not the same as thinking one is obeying [Wittgenstein]
6169 We do not achieve meaning and understanding in our heads, but in the world [Wittgenstein, by Rowlands]
6166 Was Wittgenstein's problem between individual and community, or between occasions for an individual? [Rowlands on Wittgenstein]
4144 Common human behaviour enables us to interpret an unknown language [Wittgenstein]
11049 To communicate, language needs agreement in judgment as well as definition [Wittgenstein]
4145 How do words refer to sensations? [Wittgenstein]
5676 To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein]
7875 If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it [Wittgenstein]
4146 We cannot doublecheck mental images for correctness (or confirm news with many copies of the paper) [Wittgenstein]
4147 If we only named pain by our own case, it would be like naming beetles by looking in a private box [Wittgenstein]
5659 If the reference is private, that is incompatible with the sense being public [Wittgenstein, by Scruton]
5663 It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's [Wittgenstein]
19272 To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel [Wittgenstein]
4148 What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle [Wittgenstein]
4149 We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions [Wittgenstein]
4150 Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition [Wittgenstein]
15106 Essence is expressed by grammar [Wittgenstein]
4151 Grammar tells what kind of object anything is - and theology is a kind of grammar [Wittgenstein]
4152 Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use [Wittgenstein]
4153 Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made? [Wittgenstein]
4154 Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life? [Wittgenstein]
4155 We all seem able to see quite clearly how sentences represent things when we use them [Wittgenstein]
6600 The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns [Wittgenstein]
4156 Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here" [Wittgenstein]
4157 Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests [Wittgenstein]
7092 If individuals can't tell if they are following a rule, how does a community do it? [Grayling on Wittgenstein]
4158 An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria [Wittgenstein]
6658 What is left over if I subtract my arm going up from my raising my arm? [Wittgenstein]
22490 Bring words back from metaphysics to everyday use [Wittgenstein]
11079 How do I decide when to accept or obey an intuition? [Wittgenstein]
12606 Man learns the concept of the past by remembering [Wittgenstein]
4159 The human body is the best picture of the human soul [Wittgenstein]
19273 I don't have the opinion that people have minds; I just treat them as such [Wittgenstein]
4160 One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own beliefs [Wittgenstein]
4161 If a lion could talk, we could not understand him [Wittgenstein]
7392 If a lion could talk, it would be nothing like other lions [Dennett on Wittgenstein]
18282 You can't believe it if you can't imagine a verification for it [Wittgenstein]
22320 An 'object' is just what can be referred to without possible non-existence [Wittgenstein]
18283 Language pictures the essence of the world [Wittgenstein]
6606 Consider: "Imagine this butterfly exactly as it is, but ugly instead of beautiful" [Wittgenstein]
18281 In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning [Wittgenstein]
11074 'It is true that this follows' means simply: this follows [Wittgenstein]
11073 Two and one making three has the necessity of logical inference [Wittgenstein]
7536 If you hope to improve the world, all you can do is improve yourself [Wittgenstein]
7085 The main problem of philosophy is what can and cannot be thought and expressed [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
23463 Atomic facts correspond to true elementary propositions [Wittgenstein]
23490 A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do [Wittgenstein]
7084 What can be said is what can be thought, so language shows the limits of thought [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
23507 Unlike the modern view of a set of worlds, Wittgenstein thinks of a structured manifold of them [Wittgenstein, by White,RM]
7090 The 'Tractatus' is an extreme example of 'Logical Atomism' [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
6849 Wittgenstein hated logicism, and described it as a cancerous growth [Wittgenstein, by Monk]
7088 Logic and maths can't say anything about the world, since, as tautologies, they are consistent with all realities [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
23479 The Tractatus aims to reveal the necessities, without appealing to synthetic a priori truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
17665 The 'Tractatus' is instrumentalist about laws of nature [Wittgenstein, by Armstrong]
10910 The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Wittgenstein, by Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
18349 All truths have truth-makers, but only atomic truths correspond to them [Wittgenstein, by Rami]
10967 Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth [Read on Wittgenstein]
7087 Language is [propositions-elementary propositions-names]; reality is [facts-states of affairs-objects] [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
4702 The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory [Wittgenstein, by O'Grady]
6428 Wittgenstein is right that logic is just tautologies [Wittgenstein, by Russell]
9810 The 'Tractatus' is a masterpiece of anti-philosophy [Badiou on Wittgenstein]
18154 The sign of identity is not allowed in 'Tractatus' [Wittgenstein, by Bostock]
13429 The identity sign is not essential in logical notation, if every sign has a different meaning [Wittgenstein, by Ramsey]
9467 Wittgenstein tried unsuccessfully to reduce quantifiers to conjunctions and disjunctions [Wittgenstein, by Jacquette]
13830 Logical truths are just 'by-products' of the introduction rules for logical constants [Wittgenstein, by Hacking]
7537 Wittgenstein convinced Russell that logic is tautologies, not Platonic forms [Wittgenstein, by Monk]
23499 This book says we should either say it clearly, or shut up [Wittgenstein]
23459 This work solves all the main problems, but that has little value [Wittgenstein]
13133 The world is facts, not things. Facts determine the world, and the world divides into facts [Wittgenstein]
22311 The world is determined by the facts, and there are no further facts [Wittgenstein]
23462 He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
11027 To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences [Wittgenstein]
22321 To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Wittgenstein, by Potter]
23470 Each thing is in a space of possible facts [Wittgenstein]
23465 The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts [Wittgenstein]
23467 Objects are simple [Wittgenstein]
6429 All complex statements can be resolved into constituents and descriptions [Wittgenstein]
23466 Objects are the substance of the world [Wittgenstein]
23469 An imagined world must have something in common with the real world [Wittgenstein]
12869 Two objects may only differ in being different [Wittgenstein]
23468 Apart from the facts, there is only substance [Wittgenstein]
23464 In atomic facts the objects hang together like chain links [Wittgenstein]
23471 The structure of an atomic fact is how its objects combine; this possibility is its form [Wittgenstein]
23473 Do his existent facts constitute the world, or determine the world? [Morris,M on Wittgenstein]
22313 The existence of atomic facts is a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact [Wittgenstein]
23482 The 'form' of the picture is its possible combinations [Wittgenstein]
7056 Pictures reach out to or feel reality, touching at the edges, correlating in its parts [Wittgenstein]
23483 Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
23486 Pictures are possible situations in logical space [Wittgenstein]
23485 No pictures are true a priori [Wittgenstein]
23487 What is thinkable is possible [Wittgenstein]
7089 A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object [Wittgenstein]
23506 Names are primitive, and cannot be analysed [Wittgenstein]
2939 If a sign is useless it is meaningless; that is the point of Ockham's maxim [Wittgenstein]
23492 Our language is an aspect of biology, and so its inner logic is opaque [Wittgenstein]
23510 Most philosophical questions arise from failing to understand the logic of language [Wittgenstein]
18268 Apparent logical form may not be real logical form [Wittgenstein]
23488 Propositions are understood via their constituents [Wittgenstein]
8172 To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true [Wittgenstein]
23489 We translate by means of proposition constituents, not by whole propositions [Wittgenstein]
23511 Propositions use old expressions for a new sense [Wittgenstein]
10905 My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' do not represent [Wittgenstein]
22314 On white paper a black spot is a positive fact and a white spot a negative fact [Wittgenstein]
23508 Science is all the true propositions [Wittgenstein]
7968 A relation is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it [Wittgenstein]
7969 The order of numbers is an internal relation, not an external one [Wittgenstein]
7784 'Object' is a pseudo-concept, properly indicated in logic by the variable x [Wittgenstein]
21682 If a proposition is elementary, no other elementary proposition contradicts it [Wittgenstein]
22319 Analysis must end in elementary propositions, which are combinations of names [Wittgenstein]
18277 If q implies p, that is justified by q and p, not by some 'laws' of inference [Wittgenstein]
21683 Nothing can be inferred from an elementary proposition [Wittgenstein]
16907 If the truth doesn't follow from self-evidence, then self-evidence cannot justify a truth [Wittgenstein]
23493 'Not' isn't an object, because not-not-p would then differ from p [Wittgenstein]
11062 Logic is a priori because it is impossible to think illogically [Wittgenstein]
16909 Logic is a priori because we cannot think illogically [Wittgenstein]
6056 Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein]
22322 You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable [Wittgenstein]
6057 Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept [Wittgenstein]
23498 The modern idea of the subjective soul is composite, and impossible [Wittgenstein]
23475 The form of a proposition must show why nonsense is unjudgeable [Wittgenstein]
2938 The limits of my language means the limits of my world [Wittgenstein]
23502 Logic fills the world, to its limits [Wittgenstein]
23497 Solipsism is correct, but can only be shown, not said, by the limits of my personal language [Wittgenstein]
2940 The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein]
23501 There is no a priori order of things [Wittgenstein]
23503 Strict solipsism is pure realism, with the self as a mere point in surrounding reality [Wittgenstein]
18153 A number is a repeated operation [Wittgenstein]
18160 The concept of number is just what all numbers have in common [Wittgenstein]
18161 The theory of classes is superfluous in mathematics [Wittgenstein]
18162 The propositions of logic are analytic tautologies [Wittgenstein]
23495 The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world [Wittgenstein]
15089 Logical proof just explicates complicated tautologies [Wittgenstein]
19292 Logic doesn't split into primitive and derived propositions; they all have the same status [Wittgenstein]
23509 The logic of the world is shown by tautologies in logic, and by equations in mathematics [Wittgenstein]
23504 Logic concerns everything that is subject to law; the rest is accident [Wittgenstein]
2941 Induction accepts the simplest law that fits our experiences [Wittgenstein]
9442 The only necessity is logical necessity [Wittgenstein]
17673 The modern worldview is based on the illusion that laws explain nature [Wittgenstein]
23496 Two colours in the same place is ruled out by the logical structure of colour [Wittgenstein]
2942 The sense of the world must lie outside the world [Wittgenstein]
2943 Ethics cannot be put into words [Wittgenstein]
2944 If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it [Wittgenstein]
6591 Doubts can't exist if they are inexpressible or unanswerable [Wittgenstein]
7086 Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics [Wittgenstein]
23512 Once you understand my book you will see that it is nonsensical [Wittgenstein]
6870 I say (contrary to Wittgenstein) that philosophy expresses what we thought we must be silent about [Ansell Pearson on Wittgenstein]
2937 What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence [Wittgenstein]
10710 We accept substance, to avoid infinite backwards chains of meaning [Wittgenstein, by Potter]
6569 'This sentence is false' sends us in a looping search for its proposition [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
2626 A philosopher is outside any community of ideas [Wittgenstein]
3790 Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents [Wittgenstein]