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Full Idea
There is an enormous difference between the truth of sentences in the interpreted language of set theory and truth in some model for the disinterpreted skeleton of that language.
Gist of Idea
Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language
Source
Harold Hodes (Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic [1984], p.132)
Book Ref
-: 'Journal of Philosophy' [-], p.132
A Reaction
This is a warning to me, because I thought truth and semantics only entered theories at the stage of 'interpretation'. I must go back and get the hang of 'skeletal' truth, which sounds rather charming. [He refers to set theory, not to logic.]
| 10011 | Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes] |
| 10027 | Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes] |
| 10021 | It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes] |
| 10016 | When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes] |
| 10017 | Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes] |
| 10015 | Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes] |
| 10018 | Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes] |
| 10022 | Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes] |
| 10023 | Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes] |
| 10026 | Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes] |