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Single Idea 19134

[filed under theme 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth ]

Full Idea

Tarski defined various predicates of the form 's is true in L', each applicable to a single language, but he failed to define a predicate of the form 's is true in L' for variable 'L'.

Gist of Idea

Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages

Source

comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 1

Book Ref

Davidson,Donald: 'Truth and Predication' [Belknap Harvard 2005], p.15

A Reaction

You might say that no one defines 'tree' to be just 'in English', but we might define 'multiplies' to be in Peano Arithmetic. This indicates the limited and formal nature of what Tarski was trying to achieve.

The 36 ideas from 'The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages'

10969 Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Tarski, by Read]
16306 Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses [Tarski, by Halbach]
16296 Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible [Tarski, by Halbach]
15339 Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions [Tarski, by Horsten]
16302 Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition [Tarski, by Halbach]
19135 Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages [Davidson on Tarski]
19138 Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning [Davidson on Tarski]
4699 Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language [Tarski, by O'Grady]
19324 Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs [Kirkham on Tarski]
10672 Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence [Tarski, by Hossack]
15410 Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski]
18811 Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt]
15365 We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten]
19314 For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham]
19316 Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham]
19175 Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson]
16303 Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Tarski, by Halbach]
19134 Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson on Tarski]
16304 Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction [Halbach on Tarski]
2571 Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Tarski, by Haack]
10821 Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Tarski, by Field,H]
10822 A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H on Tarski]
15322 Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate [Tarski, by Horsten]
18759 Identity is invariant under arbitrary permutations, so it seems to be a logical term [Tarski, by McGee]
17746 Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Tarski, by Walicki]
10904 Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski]
16295 Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach]
15342 Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Tarski, by Horsten]
18756 Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions [Tarski, by McGee]
19313 Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth [Tarski, by Kirkham]
8940 Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language [Tarski, by Fisher]
16323 The object language/ metalanguage distinction is the basis of model theory [Tarski, by Halbach]
10154 Tarski's theory of truth shifted the approach away from syntax, to set theory and semantics [Feferman/Feferman on Tarski]
20407 Taste is the capacity to judge an object or representation which is thought to be beautiful [Tarski, by Schellekens]
19069 'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless [Tarski]
10823 A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function [Tarski]