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Single Idea 19205
[filed under theme 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
]
Full Idea
It is contingently true that 'snow is white' expresses the proposition that snow is white.
Gist of Idea
'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white
Source
Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 1.V n14)
Book Ref
Merricks,Trenton: 'Propositions' [OUP 2015], p.25
A Reaction
Tarski stuck to sentences, but Merricks rightly argues that truth concerns propositions, not sentences. Sentences are subservient entities - mere tools used to express what matters, which is our thoughts (say I).
The
35 ideas
with the same theme
[significance of formal defintions of linguistic truth]:
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10824
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If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs
[Field,H on Tarski]
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16303
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Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined
[Tarski, by Halbach]
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10822
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A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory
[Field,H on Tarski]
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17746
|
Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics
[Tarski, by Walicki]
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10904
|
Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences
[Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski]
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10969
|
Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth
[Tarski, by Read]
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19134
|
Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages
[Davidson on Tarski]
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16304
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Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction
[Halbach on Tarski]
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2571
|
Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics
[Tarski, by Haack]
|
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10821
|
Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it
[Tarski, by Field,H]
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9012
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Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences
[Quine]
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10841
|
The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement
[Strawson,P]
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6264
|
In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language
[Putnam]
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6265
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Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept
[Putnam]
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6269
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Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true'
[Putnam]
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2345
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Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation
[Putnam]
|
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3744
|
The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions
[O'Connor]
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3749
|
What does 'true in English' mean?
[O'Connor]
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8166
|
Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth
[Dummett]
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19171
|
Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means
[Dummett, by Davidson]
|
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19136
|
Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning
[Davidson]
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19139
|
Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common
[Davidson]
|
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19147
|
Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language
[Davidson]
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19172
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To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language
[Davidson]
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15327
|
Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories
[Kripke, by Horsten]
|
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15343
|
Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models)
[Kripke, by Horsten]
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10017
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Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth
[Hodes]
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10018
|
Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language
[Hodes]
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19320
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If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite
[Kirkham]
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14968
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A weakened classical language can contain its own truth predicate
[Gupta]
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13503
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A first-order language has an infinity of T-sentences, which cannot add up to a definition of truth
[Hart,WD]
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10170
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While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be
[Reck/Price]
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19205
|
'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white
[Merricks]
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16337
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Disquotational truth theories are short of deductive power
[Halbach]
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19127
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The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative
[Halbach/Leigh]
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