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Single Idea 9012

[filed under theme 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth ]

Full Idea

The truth predicate has its utility in places where we are compelled to mention sentences. It then serves to point through the sentence to the reality; it serves as a reminder that though sentences are mentioned, reality is still the whole point.

Gist of Idea

Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences

Source

Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.1)

Book Ref

Quine,Willard: 'Philosophy of Logic' [Prentice-Hall 1970], p.11

A Reaction

A sensible interpretation of the Tarskian account of truth as disquotation. Quine neatly combines a common sense correspondence with a sophisticated logicians view of the role of truth. So what does "I want the truth here" mean?

The 35 ideas with the same theme [significance of formal defintions of linguistic truth]:

10824 If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski]
16303 Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Tarski, by Halbach]
10822 A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H on Tarski]
17746 Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Tarski, by Walicki]
10904 Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski]
10969 Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Tarski, by Read]
19134 Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson on Tarski]
16304 Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction [Halbach on Tarski]
2571 Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Tarski, by Haack]
10821 Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Tarski, by Field,H]
9012 Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences [Quine]
10841 The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement [Strawson,P]
6264 In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam]
6265 Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam]
6269 Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam]
2345 Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam]
3744 The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor]
3749 What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor]
8166 Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett]
19171 Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson]
19136 Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson]
19139 Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson]
19147 Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson]
19172 To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson]
15327 Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories [Kripke, by Horsten]
15343 Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models) [Kripke, by Horsten]
10017 Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes]
10018 Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes]
19320 If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham]
14968 A weakened classical language can contain its own truth predicate [Gupta]
13503 A first-order language has an infinity of T-sentences, which cannot add up to a definition of truth [Hart,WD]
10170 While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price]
19205 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks]
16337 Disquotational truth theories are short of deductive power [Halbach]
19127 The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh]