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Single Idea 5234

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch ]

Full Idea

For the magnanimous or great-souled man there are some circumstances in which it is not worth living.

Gist of Idea

For the great-souled man it is sometimes better to be dead

Source

Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1124b08)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Ethics (Nicomachean)', ed/tr. ThomsonJ A K/TredennickH [Penguin 1976], p.156

A Reaction

He is not talking of suicide here, but of risking one's life. This seems to be a hallmark of the normally virtuous person, as well as of someone exceptional. Most people would agree with this, but for Aristotle it is a central issue.

The 229 ideas from 'Nicomachean Ethics'

2682 Aristotle thinks human life is not important enough to spend a whole life on it [Nagel on Aristotle]
4370 For Aristotle 'good' means purpose, and value is real but relational [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
21047 Aristotle thought slavery is just if it is both necessary and natural [Aristotle, by Sandel]
3559 For Aristotle, true self-love is love of the higher parts of one's soul [Aristotle, by Annas]
8007 Aristotle never discusses free will [Aristotle, by MacIntyre]
4326 Aristotle gives a superior account of rationality, because he allows emotions to participate [Hursthouse on Aristotle]
4371 Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
5075 Aristotle said there are two levels of virtue - the conventional and the intellectual [Taylor,R on Aristotle]
18673 Eudaimonia is said to only have final value, where reason and virtue are also useful [Aristotle, by Orsi]
2681 Aristotle is unsure about eudaimonia because he is unsure what people are [Nagel on Aristotle]
3548 Aristotle neglects the place of rules in the mature virtuous person [Annas on Aristotle]
4369 It is not universals we must perceive for virtue, but particulars, seen as intrinsically good [Aristotle, by Achtenberg]
4117 Nowadays we (unlike Aristotle) seem agreed that someone can have one virtue but lack others [Williams,B on Aristotle]
21044 For Aristotle, debates about justice are debates about the good life [Aristotle, by Sandel]
2684 Aristotle needed to distinguish teleological description from teleological explanation [Irwin on Aristotle]
20 The good is 'that at which all things aim' [Aristotle]
4380 Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
21 Moral acts are so varied that they must be convention, not nature [Aristotle]
22 Trained minds never expect more precision than is possible [Aristotle]
23 The masses believe, not unreasonably, that the good is pleasure [Aristotle]
24 Honour depends too much on the person who awards it [Aristotle]
4119 If you aim at honour, you make yourself dependent on the people to whom you wish to be superior [Aristotle, by Williams,B]
25 You can be good while asleep, or passive, or in pain [Aristotle]
26 Wealth is not the good, because it is only a means [Aristotle]
21356 Piety requires us to honour truth above our friends [Aristotle]
5128 Each category of existence has its own good, so one Good cannot unite them [Aristotle]
5129 There should be one science of the one Good, but there are many overlapping sciences [Aristotle]
5130 It is meaningless to speak of 'man-himself', because it has the same definition as plain 'man' [Aristotle]
27 Eternal white is no whiter than temporary white, and it is the same with goodness [Aristotle]
5131 Intelligence and sight, and some pleasures and honours, are candidates for being good in themselves [Aristotle]
28 How will a vision of pure goodness make someone a better doctor? [Aristotle]
18227 We desire final things just for themselves, and not for the sake of something else [Aristotle]
5132 Goods like pleasure are chosen partly for happiness, but happiness is chosen just for itself [Aristotle]
5133 Man is by nature a social being [Aristotle]
30 Happiness is perfect and self-sufficient, the end of all action [Aristotle]
5127 Does Aristotle say eudaimonia is the aim, or that it ought to be? [McDowell on Aristotle]
5134 Perhaps we get a better account of happiness as the good for man if we know his function [Aristotle]
31 If bodily organs have functions, presumably the whole person has one [Aristotle]
33 Each named function has a distinctive excellence attached to it [Aristotle]
34 The good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue [Aristotle]
35 A statement is true if all the data are in harmony with it [Aristotle]
5135 Goods are external, of the soul, and of the body; those of the soul (such as action) come first [Aristotle]
5136 Happiness seems to involve virtue, or practical reason, or wisdom, or pleasure, or external goods [Aristotle]
5137 Many pleasures are relative to a person, but some love what is pleasant by nature, and virtue is like that [Aristotle]
5138 The fine deeds required for happiness need external resources, like friends or wealth [Aristotle]
38 A man can't be happy if he is ugly, or of low birth, or alone and childless [Aristotle]
5139 If happiness can be achieved by study and effort, then it is open to anyone who is not corrupt [Aristotle]
5140 Political science aims at the highest good, which involves creating virtue in citizens [Aristotle]
5142 Oxen, horses and children cannot be happy, because they cannot perform fine deeds [Aristotle]
39 Happiness needs total goodness and a complete life [Aristotle]
5143 Some good and evil can happen to the dead, just as the living may be unaware of a disaster [Aristotle]
5144 Happiness is activity in accordance with complete virtue, for a whole life, with adequate external goods [Aristotle]
4342 Aristotle must hold that virtuous King Priam's life can be marred, but not ruined [Hursthouse on Aristotle]
4381 How can an action be intrinsically good if it is a means to 'eudaimonia'? [Ackrill on Aristotle]
5145 The rational and irrational parts of the soul are either truly separate, or merely described that way [Aristotle]
5146 Everything that receives nourishment has a vegetative soul, with it own distinctive excellence [Aristotle]
4383 Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
5147 In a controlled person the receptive part of the soul is obedient, and it is in harmony in the virtuous [Aristotle]
5148 The irrational psuché is persuadable by reason - shown by our criticism and encouragement of people [Aristotle]
5149 The two main parts of the soul give rise to two groups of virtues - intellectual, and moral [Aristotle]
5150 Intellectual virtue arises from instruction (and takes time), whereas moral virtue result from habit [Aristotle]
4367 Moral virtue is not natural, because its behaviour can be changed, unlike a falling stone [Aristotle]
43 Nature enables us to be virtuous, but habit develops virtue in us [Aristotle]
44 We acquire virtues by habitually performing good deeds [Aristotle]
21046 The aim of legislators, and of a good constitution, is to create good citizens [Aristotle]
5151 Justice concerns our behaviour in dealing with other people [Aristotle]
5152 Like activities produce like dispositions, so we must give the right quality to the activity [Aristotle]
45 We aim not to identify goodness, but to be good [Aristotle]
46 We must take for granted that we should act according to right principle [Aristotle]
5153 There is no fixed art of good conduct, and each situation is different, as in navigation [Aristotle]
3545 The mean implies that vices are opposed to one another, not to virtue [Aristotle, by Annas]
5154 Excess and deficiency are bad for virtue, just as they are for bodily health [Aristotle]
47 Virtues are destroyed by the excess and preserved by the mean [Aristotle]
4406 Aristotle aims at happiness by depressing emotions to a harmless mean [Nietzsche on Aristotle]
4378 We must practise virtuous acts because practice actually teaches us the nature of virtue [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
49 Character is revealed by the pleasures and pains people feel [Aristotle]
4382 Feelings are vital to virtue, but virtue requires choice, which feelings lack [Kosman on Aristotle]
51 True education is training from infancy to have correct feelings [Aristotle]
52 We choose things for their fineness, their advantage, or for pleasure [Aristotle]
53 Feeling inappropriate pleasure or pain affects conduct, and is central to morality [Aristotle]
5156 How can good actions breed virtues, if you need to be virtuous to perform good actions? [Aristotle]
6793 People can break into the circle of virtue and good action, by chance, or with help [Aristotle]
54 Actions are not virtuous because of their quality, but because of the way they are done [Aristotle]
57 We acquire virtue by the repeated performance of just and temperate acts [Aristotle]
58 If virtues are not feelings or faculties, then they must be dispositions [Aristotle]
5157 If a thing has excellence, this makes the thing good, and means it functions well [Aristotle]
60 The mean is relative to the individual (diet, for example) [Aristotle]
61 Skills are only well performed if they observe the mean [Aristotle]
4388 One drink a day is moderation, but very drunk once a week could exhibit the mean [Urmson on Aristotle]
4373 Virtue is the feeling of emotions that accord with one's perception of value [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
4387 In most normal situations it is not appropriate to have any feelings at all [Urmson on Aristotle]
62 We must tune our feelings to be right in every way [Aristotle]
63 Virtue is a purposive mean disposition, which follows a rational principle and prudent judgment [Aristotle]
64 There is no right time or place or way or person for the committing of adultery; it is just wrong [Aristotle]
5158 Actions concern particular cases, and rules must fit the cases, not the other way round [Aristotle]
5159 The mean is always right, and the extremes are always wrong [Aristotle]
5160 There is a mean of feelings, as in our responses to the good or bad fortune of others [Aristotle]
4333 Contraries are by definition as far distant as possible from one another [Aristotle]
65 The vices to which we are most strongly pulled are most opposed to the mean [Aristotle]
5161 To make one's anger exactly appropriate to a situation is very difficult [Aristotle]
5211 An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent [Aristotle]
5212 A man should sooner die than do some dreadful things, no matter how cruel the death [Aristotle]
5213 If you repent of an act done through ignorance, you acted involuntarily, not non-voluntarily [Aristotle]
67 Bad people are just ignorant of what they ought to do [Aristotle]
5214 Acts may be forgivable if particular facts (rather than principles) are unknown [Aristotle]
20192 Aristotle assesses whether people are responsible, and if they are it was voluntary [Aristotle, by Zagzebski]
5215 There are six categories of particular cirumstance affecting an action [Aristotle]
5216 An act is involuntary if the particular facts (esp. circumstances and effect) are unknown [Aristotle]
5217 At times we ought to feel angry, and we ought to desire health and learning [Aristotle]
12961 For an action to be 'free', it must be deliberate as well as unconstrained [Aristotle, by Leibniz]
68 The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire [Aristotle]
4318 Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action. [Aristotle, by Cottingham]
4372 Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
24037 We all assume immortality is impossible [Aristotle]
4391 Opinion is praised for being in accordance with truth [Aristotle]
5218 Some people are good at forming opinions, but bad at making moral choices [Aristotle]
5219 Types of cause are nature, necessity and chance, and mind and human agency [Aristotle]
23320 Choice is not explained by the will, but by the operation of reason when it judges what is good [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
69 We deliberate about means, not ends [Aristotle]
5220 Particular facts (such as 'is it cooked?') are matters of sense-perception, not deliberation [Aristotle]
5221 Deliberation ends when the starting-point of an action is traced back to the dominant part of the self [Aristotle]
5222 A person of good character sees the truth about what is actually fine and pleasant [Aristotle]
4118 A human being fathers his own actions as he fathers his children [Aristotle]
4394 People develop their characters through the activities they pursue [Aristotle]
4384 For Aristotle responsibility seems negative, in the absence of force or ignorance [Irwin on Aristotle]
5223 We are partly responsible for our own dispositions and virtues [Aristotle]
5224 Strictly speaking, a courageous person is one who does not fear an honourable death [Aristotle]
5225 The end of virtue is what is right and honourable or fine [Aristotle]
5226 True courage is an appropriate response to a dangerous situation [Aristotle]
5227 The nature of any given thing is determined by its end [Aristotle]
5228 A suicide embraces death to run away from hardships, rather than because it is a fine deed [Aristotle]
5229 The more virtuous and happy a person is, the worse the prospect becomes of ending life [Aristotle]
5230 There are pleasures of the soul (e.g. civic honour, and learning) and of the body [Aristotle]
71 Licentiousness concerns the animal-like pleasures of touch and taste [Aristotle]
5231 To eat vast amounts is unnatural, since natural desire is to replenish the deficiency [Aristotle]
5232 If beings are dominated by appetite, this can increase so much that it drives out reason [Aristotle]
5233 Honour is clearly the greatest external good [Aristotle]
5234 For the great-souled man it is sometimes better to be dead [Aristotle]
5235 Patient people are indignant, but only appropriately, as their reason prescribes [Aristotle]
5236 It is foolish not to be angry when it is appropriate [Aristotle]
5237 We cannot properly judge by rules, because blame depends on perception of particulars [Aristotle]
5238 The sincere man is praiseworthy, because truth is the mean between boasting and irony [Aristotle]
4389 What emotion is displayed in justice, and what are its deficiency and excess? [Urmson on Aristotle]
5239 When people speak of justice they mean a disposition of character to behave justly [Aristotle]
5240 The word 'unjust' describes law-breaking and exploitation [Aristotle]
5241 We hold that every piece of legislation is just [Aristotle]
5242 Justice is whatever creates or preserves social happiness [Aristotle]
5243 The best people exercise their virtue towards others, rather than to themselves [Aristotle]
23556 Particular justice concerns specific temptations, but universal justice concerns the whole character [Aristotle]
5245 Society collapses if people cannot rely on exchanging good for good and evil for evil [Aristotle]
5246 Natural justice is the same everywhere, and does not (unlike legal justice) depend on acceptance [Aristotle]
72 Assume our reason is in two parts, one for permanent first principles, and one for variable things [Aristotle]
73 Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite [Aristotle]
4405 The attainment of truth is the task of the intellectual part of the soul [Aristotle]
76 The object of scientific knowledge is what is necessary [Aristotle]
20212 Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings [Aristotle]
78 Wisdom is scientific and intuitive knowledge of what is by nature most precious [Aristotle]
5247 Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct [Aristotle]
79 Intuition grasps the definitions that can't be proved [Aristotle]
5248 Wisdom does not study happiness, because it is not concerned with processes [Aristotle]
80 Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them [Aristotle]
55 People who perform just acts unwillingly or ignorantly are still not just [Aristotle]
56 A person is good if they act from choice, and for the sake of the actions in themselves [Aristotle]
5249 One cannot be prudent without being good [Aristotle]
4362 Dispositions to virtue are born in us, but without intelligence they can be harmful [Aristotle]
81 For Socrates virtues are principles, involving knowledge, but we say they only imply the principle of practical reason [Aristotle]
82 The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues [Aristotle]
4386 Character can be heroic, excellent, controlled, uncontrolled, bad, or brutish [Aristotle, by Urmson]
5250 The three states of character to avoid are vice, 'akrasia' and brutishness [Aristotle]
5251 Gods exist in a state which is morally superior to virtue [Aristotle]
22141 It is enough if we refute the objections and leave common opinions undisturbed [Aristotle]
5252 'Enkrateia' (control) means abiding by one's own calculations [Aristotle]
5254 Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge [Aristotle]
5255 A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular [Aristotle]
23317 Aristotle sees akrasia as acting against what is chosen, not against reason [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
23318 Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
5256 Some things are not naturally pleasant, but become so through disease or depravity [Aristotle]
5257 Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance [Aristotle]
5258 While replenishing we even enjoy unpleasant things, but only absolute pleasures when we are replenished [Aristotle]
84 The greater the pleasure, the greater the hindrance to thought [Aristotle]
1665 It is nonsense to say a good person is happy even if they are being tortured or suffering disaster [Aristotle]
5259 If we criticise bodily pleasures as licentious and bad, why do we consider their opposite, pain, to be bad? [Aristotle]
383 God feels one simple pleasure forever [Aristotle]
2686 Aristotle does not confine supreme friendship to moral heroes [Cooper,JM on Aristotle]
5260 Friendship holds communities together, and lawgivers value it more than justice [Aristotle]
5261 Between friends there is no need for justice [Aristotle]
5262 Only lovable things are loved, and they must be good, or pleasant, or useful [Aristotle]
2687 For Aristotle in the best friendships the binding force is some excellence of character [Cooper,JM on Aristotle]
85 Bad men can have friendships of utility or pleasure, but only good men can be true friends [Aristotle]
5263 Most people want to be loved rather than to love, because they desire honour [Aristotle]
5264 Friendship is based on a community of sharing [Aristotle]
86 A bad political constitution (especially a tyranny) makes friendship almost impossible [Aristotle]
87 Democracy is the best constitution for friendship, because it encourages equality [Aristotle]
5265 Even more than a social being, man is a pairing and family being [Aristotle]
88 Nobody would choose all the good things in world, if the price was loss of identity [Aristotle]
5266 It would seem that the thinking part is the individual self [Aristotle]
90 All altruism is an extension of self-love [Aristotle]
91 A man is his own best friend; therefore he ought to love himself best [Aristotle]
5267 Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing [Aristotle]
92 Self-love benefits ourselves, and also helps others [Aristotle]
2689 Good people enjoy virtuous action, just as musicians enjoy beautiful melodies [Aristotle]
2690 Associating with good people can be a training in virtue [Aristotle]
2573 To perceive or think is to be conscious of our existence [Aristotle]
93 Existence is desirable if one is conscious of one's own goodness [Aristotle]
95 If everyone believes it, it is true [Aristotle]
4374 For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
5268 Disreputable pleasures are only pleasant to persons with diseased perception [Aristotle]
96 Nobody would choose the mentality of a child, even if they had the greatest childish pleasures [Aristotle]
97 There are many things we would want even if they brought no pleasure [Aristotle]
5269 Pleasure is not the Good, and not every pleasure is desirable [Aristotle]
98 It is right to pursue pleasure, because it enhances life, and life is a thing to choose [Aristotle]
5270 Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones [Aristotle]
99 If happiness were mere amusement it wouldn't be worth a lifetime's effort [Aristotle]
100 The happy life is in accordance with goodness, which implies seriousness [Aristotle]
101 Slaves can't be happy, because they lack freedom [Aristotle]
103 Wise people can contemplate alone, though co-operation helps [Aristotle]
18229 Only contemplation is sought for its own sake; practical activity always offers some gain [Aristotle]
104 Contemplation (with the means to achieve it) is the perfect happiness for man [Aristotle]
5272 The intellectual life is divine in comparison with ordinary human life [Aristotle]
105 We should aspire to immortality, and live by what is highest in us [Aristotle]
106 The best life is that of the intellect, since that is in the fullest sense the man [Aristotle]
107 A life of moral virtue brings human happiness, but not divine happiness [Aristotle]
108 The virtue of generosity requires money [Aristotle]
109 Clearly perfect conduct will involve both good intention and good action [Aristotle]
18232 The gods live, but action is unworthy of them, so that only leaves contemplation? [Aristotle]
110 Lower animals cannot be happy, because they cannot contemplate [Aristotle]
111 The more people contemplate, the happier they are [Aristotle]
4379 It is very hard to change a person's character traits by argument [Aristotle]
112 Most people are readier to submit to compulsion than to argument [Aristotle]