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Single Idea 3838

[filed under theme 23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping ]

Full Idea

The obligation to keep a promise does not derive from the institution of promising, ..but from the fact that in promising I freely and voluntarily create a reason for myself.

Gist of Idea

Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution

Source

John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.6.IV)

Book Ref

Searle,John R.: 'Rationality in Action' [MIT 2001], p.198

The 34 ideas from 'Rationality in Action'

3811 Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle]
3809 If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle]
3810 In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle]
3812 Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle]
3814 Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle]
3808 Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle]
3815 The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle]
3813 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle]
3816 Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle]
3818 We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle]
3817 Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle]
3825 Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle]
3826 A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle]
3827 The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle]
3828 Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle]
3822 Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle]
3823 Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle]
3821 Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle]
3820 The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle]
3824 A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle]
3829 Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle]
3830 In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle]
3832 Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle]
3831 Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle]
3833 A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle]
3834 An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle]
3835 If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle]
3836 If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle]
3839 Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle]
3837 We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle]
3838 Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle]
3840 We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle]
3841 Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle]
3806 Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle]