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Single Idea 14663

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions ]

Full Idea

Are there two sorts of thing, propositions and states of affairs, or only one? I am inclined to the former view on the ground that propositions have a property, truth or falsehood, not had by states of affairs.

Gist of Idea

Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one

Source

Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 1)

Book Ref

Plantinga,Alvin: 'Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality' [OUP 2003], p.108

A Reaction

Might a proposition be nothing more than an assertion that a state of affairs obtains? It would then pass his test. The idea that a proposition is a complex of facts in the external world ('Russellian' propositions?) quite baffles me.

The 44 ideas from Alvin Plantinga

16472 Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
16469 Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
16470 Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
14662 Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
14663 Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
14664 Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga]
14666 Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga]
13132 A snowball's haecceity is the property of being identical with itself [Plantinga, by Westerhoff]
14642 Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga]
14643 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga]
14646 An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga]
14647 Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga]
14648 Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga]
14649 Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga]
14650 Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga]
14651 What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga]
1475 It is logically possible that natural evil like earthquakes is caused by Satan [Plantinga, by PG]
1474 Moral evil may be acceptable to God because it allows free will (even though we don't see why this is necessary) [Plantinga, by PG]
11891 Possibilities for an individual can only refer to that individual, in some possible world [Plantinga, by Mackie,P]
18383 Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Plantinga, by Armstrong]
20704 A possible world contains a being of maximal greatness - which is existence in all worlds [Plantinga, by Davies,B]
9084 Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga]
9085 If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga]
9086 The idea of abstract objects is not ontological; it comes from the epistemological idea of abstraction [Plantinga]
9087 Theists may see abstract objects as really divine thoughts [Plantinga]
11984 Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga]
11980 A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga]
11982 If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga]
11983 It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga]
11985 If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga]
11986 The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
11987 Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
6356 Maybe a reliable justification must come from a process working with its 'proper function' [Plantinga, by Pollock/Cruz]
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
14652 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
14653 X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
14654 Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
14655 The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
14658 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
14656 Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
14657 Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
14659 We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
14660 If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
14661 Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]