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Single Idea 19200

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions ]

Full Idea

The thesis that propositions are sets of possible worlds is one of the two leading accounts of the nature of propositions. The other leading account endorses structured propositions.

Gist of Idea

Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured

Source

Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], Intro)

Book Ref

Merricks,Trenton: 'Propositions' [OUP 2015], p.-3

A Reaction

Merricks sets out to reject both main views. I take the idea that propositions actually are sets of possible worlds to be ridiculous (though they may offer a way of modelling them). The idea that they have no structure at all strikes me as odd.

The 33 ideas with the same theme [ideas that exist independently from any language]:

20787 A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus]
22276 Bolzano saw propositions as objective entities, existing independently of us [Bolzano, by Potter]
23205 Thought starts as ambiguity, in need of interpretation and narrowing [Nietzsche]
14451 Propositions are mainly verbal expressions of true or false, and perhaps also symbolic thoughts [Russell]
21543 If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell]
5781 Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell]
5782 A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell]
5776 A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell]
6091 Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell]
14110 Proposition contain entities indicated by words, rather than the words themselves [Russell]
18711 A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein]
13976 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle]
5162 Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer]
8169 We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett]
19158 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson]
14663 Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
3085 Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman]
13944 We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
13947 'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
16442 I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker]
16447 A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker]
6340 There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich]
7702 The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism [Jacquette]
13962 Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers]
10966 A proposition objectifies what a sentence says, as indicative, with secure references [Read]
9452 Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer]
9453 Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer]
19200 Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks]
19206 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks]
21656 Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber]
13233 Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall]
23491 There must exist a general form of propositions, which are predictabe. It is: such and such is the case [Morris,M]
18920 'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen]