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Full Idea
If p is a false affirmative proposition ...then it seems obvious that if we believe not-p we do know something true, so belief in not-p must be something which is not mere disbelief. This proves that there are negative propositions.
Gist of Idea
If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist
Source
Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.75)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'Essays in Analysis', ed/tr. Lackey,Douglas [George Braziller 1973], p.75
A Reaction
This evidently assumes excluded middle, but is none the worse for that. But it sounds suspiciously like believing there is no rhinoceros in the room. Does such a belief require a fact?
| 21532 | Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell] |
| 21533 | Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell] |
| 21534 | The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell] |
| 21535 | Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell] |
| 21536 | When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell] |
| 21538 | If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell] |
| 21537 | I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell] |
| 21539 | Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell] |
| 21540 | Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell] |
| 21541 | The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell] |
| 21542 | Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell] |
| 21543 | If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell] |
| 21544 | It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell] |