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Full Idea
The reductionist view of propositions sees them as either extensional functions from possible worlds to truth values, or as ordered sets of properties, relations, and perhaps particulars.
Gist of Idea
Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations
Source
George Bealer (Propositions [1998], §1)
Book Ref
'Philosophy of Logic: an anthology', ed/tr. Jacquette,Dale [Blackwell 2002], p.121
A Reaction
The usual problem of all functional accounts is 'what is it about x that enables it to have that function?' And if they are sets, where does the ordering come in? A proposition isn't just a list of items in some particular order. Both wrong.
| 9452 | Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer] |
| 9453 | Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer] |
| 9451 | Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer] |
| 9454 | The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer] |
| 9455 | Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer] |