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Single Idea 3584
[filed under theme 3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
]
Full Idea
Contemporary coherence theorists are advancing a theory of justification, not of truth, …with those who argue that truth is also coherence explaining it in terms of ideal coherence, or coherence at the limit of enquiry.
Gist of Idea
Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence
Source
Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10)
Book Ref
Williams,Michael: 'Problems of Knowledge' [OUP 2001], p.118
The
29 ideas
from 'Problems of Knowledge'
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3566
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We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire
[Williams,M]
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3564
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Is it people who are justified, or propositions?
[Williams,M]
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3565
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Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable
[Williams,M]
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3573
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Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions
[Williams,M]
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3571
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Externalism does not require knowing that you know
[Williams,M]
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3567
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How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts?
[Williams,M]
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3569
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In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief
[Williams,M]
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3574
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Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge
[Williams,M]
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3575
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Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity
[Williams,M]
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3576
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Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security
[Williams,M]
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3577
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Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs
[Williams,M]
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3580
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Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations
[Williams,M]
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3578
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Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences?
[Williams,M]
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3579
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Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world
[Williams,M]
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3582
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Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible
[Williams,M]
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3581
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Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional
[Williams,M]
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3584
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Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence
[Williams,M]
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3585
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Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict
[Williams,M]
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3587
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Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory
[Williams,M]
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3586
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Only a belief can justify a belief
[Williams,M]
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3588
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Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences
[Williams,M]
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3589
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Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected?
[Williams,M]
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3590
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Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself
[Williams,M]
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3591
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We could never pin down how many beliefs we have
[Williams,M]
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3593
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The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence
[Williams,M]
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3592
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Phenomenalism is a form of idealism
[Williams,M]
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3595
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What works always takes precedence over theories
[Williams,M]
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3594
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Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things
[Williams,M]
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3599
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Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe
[Williams,M]
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