more on this theme     |     more from this thinker

Single Idea 4738

[filed under theme 3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth ]

Full Idea

The coherence theory of truth says that it is a relationship between truth-bearers themselves, that is between propositions or beliefs or sentences.

Gist of Idea

The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers

Source

Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §1.1)

Book Ref

Engel,Pascal: 'Truth' [Acumen 2002], p.11

A Reaction

We immediately begin to wonder how many truth-bearers are required. Two lies can be coherent. It is hard to make thousands of lies coherent, but not impossible. What fixes the critical number. 'All possible propositions' is not much help.

The 16 ideas from 'Truth'

4739 In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel]
4737 Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel]
4738 The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel]
4744 We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel]
4745 Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel]
4746 Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel]
4750 The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel]
4751 Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel]
4752 Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel]
4754 Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel]
4753 Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel]
4755 Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel]
4759 Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel]
4762 The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel]
4764 We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel]
4763 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel]