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Single Idea 11121
[filed under theme 18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
]
Full Idea
The language of thought is taken to have subject/predicate form and include logical devices, such as quantifiers and variables.
Gist of Idea
Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices
Source
E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1.1)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.2
The
23 ideas
from E Margolis/S Laurence
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11120
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Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11121
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Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11122
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A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11124
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Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11123
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Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11125
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The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11128
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Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11129
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The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11130
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Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11131
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It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11134
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People don't just categorise by apparent similarities
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11136
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Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11133
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Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11135
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Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11132
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The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11137
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The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11138
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The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts?
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11139
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Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11140
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Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11141
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Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11142
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Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11146
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People can formulate new concepts which are only named later
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11147
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Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition
[Margolis/Laurence]
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