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Full Idea
Quine and Kripke's Wittgenstein attempt to argue that there are no facts about meaning, that the notion of meaning, as Kripke puts it, 'vanishes into thin air'.
Gist of Idea
Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air'
Source
report of Saul A. Kripke (Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language [1982]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language Pref
Book Ref
Miller,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Language' [UCL Press 1998], p.-6
A Reaction
A tempting solution to the problem. If, though, it is possible for someone to say something that is self-evidently meaningless, or to accuse someone of speaking (deep down) without meaning, then that needs explaining.
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