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Single Idea 13178

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects ]

Full Idea

Things that differ in place must express their place, that is, they must express the things surrounding, and thus they must be distinguished not only by place, that is, not by an extrinsic denomination alone, as is commonly thought.

Gist of Idea

Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1703.06.20)

Book Ref

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'Philosophical Essays', ed/tr. Arlew,R /Garber,D [Hackett 1989], p.175


A Reaction

This is an unusual view, which has some attractions, as it enables the relations of a thing to individuate it, while maintaining that this is a real difference in character.

Related Idea

Idea 10195 If the universe just held two indiscernibles spheres, that refutes the Identity of Indiscernibles [Black]


The 26 ideas from 'Letters to Burcher De Volder'

The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change [Leibniz]
An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz]
Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz]
Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz]
Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz]
Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz]
If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz]
In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz]
Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz]
A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power [Leibniz]
Space is the order of coexisting possibles [Leibniz]
Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities [Leibniz]
The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz]
The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz]
Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances [Leibniz]
Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz]
The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz]
Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws [Leibniz]
Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz]
Only unities have any reality [Leibniz]
Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz]
Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz]
In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz]
The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz]
Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz]
A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him [Leibniz]