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Single Idea 17554

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects ]

Full Idea

There are never two beings in nature that are perfectly alike, two beings in which it is not possible to discover an internal difference, that is, one founded on an intrinsic denomination.

Gist of Idea

There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §09)

Book Ref

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'Philosophical Essays', ed/tr. Arlew,R /Garber,D [Hackett 1989], p.214


A Reaction

From this it follows that if two things really are indiscernible, then we must say that they are one thing. He says monads all differ from one another. People certainly do. Leibniz must say this of electrons. How can he know this?


The 38 ideas with the same theme [objects between which no differences are detectable]:

Each thing must be in some way unique [Diogenes of Apollonia]
If we made a perfect duplicate of Cratylus, there would be two Cratyluses [Plato]
There cannot be two substances with the same attributes [Spinoza]
There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature [Leibniz]
No two things are totally identical [Leibniz]
Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz]
If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz]
In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz]
Two eggs can't be identical, because the same truths can't apply to both of them [Leibniz]
The Identity of Indiscernibles is true of concepts with identical properties, but not of particulars [Kant, by Jolley]
If we ignore differences between water drops, we still distinguish them by their location [Kant]
An object is identical with itself, and no different indiscernible object can share that [Russell/Whitehead, by Adams,RM]
It at least makes sense to say two objects have all their properties in common [Wittgenstein on Russell]
Terms are identical if they belong to all the same classes [Russell]
We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse [Quine]
If the universe just held two indiscernibles spheres, that refutes the Identity of Indiscernibles [Black]
One thing can look like something else, without being the something else [Ellis]
If the universe was cyclical, totally indiscernible events might occur from time to time [Adams,RM]
Two events might be indiscernible yet distinct, if there was a universe cyclical in time [Adams,RM]
Black's two globes might be one globe in highly curved space [Adams,RM]
a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody]
The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker]
By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself! [Wiggins]
The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley]
Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K]
The Indiscernibility of Identicals is a truism; but the Identity of Indiscernibles depends on possible identical worlds [Rey]
If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same? [Jubien]
The Indiscernibility of Identicals has been a big problem for modal logic [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe]
The identity of indiscernibles is necessarily true, if being a member of some set counts as a property [Sider]
Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false [Moreland]
If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible [Zimmerman,DW]
Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts [Zimmerman,DW]
The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia]
Leibniz's Law is about the properties of objects; the Identity of Indiscernibles is about perception of objects [Baggini /Fosl]
At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law [Macdonald,C]
The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true [Macdonald,C]
The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA]