more on this theme     |     more from this thinker


Single Idea 19412

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects ]

Full Idea

If two bodies differ only in their position, their individual relations to the environment must be taken into account, so that more is involved in their distinguishability than just position.

Gist of Idea

If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1703.06.20)

Book Ref

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'Leibniz Selections', ed/tr. Wiener,Philip P. [Scribners 1951], p.180


A Reaction

This seems to allow that two bodies could be intrinsically type-identical (though differing in extrinsic features), which is contrary to his normal view. I suppose a different location in the gravitational field will make an intrinsic difference.


The 26 ideas from 'Letters to Burcher De Volder'

The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change [Leibniz]
An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz]
Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz]
Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz]
Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz]
Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz]
If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz]
In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz]
Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz]
A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power [Leibniz]
Space is the order of coexisting possibles [Leibniz]
Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities [Leibniz]
The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz]
The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz]
Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances [Leibniz]
Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz]
The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz]
Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws [Leibniz]
Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz]
Only unities have any reality [Leibniz]
Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz]
Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz]
In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz]
The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz]
Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz]
A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him [Leibniz]