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Single Idea 7928

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects ]

Full Idea

One common argument to the conclusion that the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is false is that it is not necessarily true.

Gist of Idea

The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true

Source

Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.2 n32)

Book Ref

Macdonald,Cynthia: 'Varieties of Things' [Blackwell 2005], p.75

A Reaction

This sounds like a good argument. If you test the Principle with an example ('this butler is the murderer') then total identity does not seem to necessitate identity, though it strongly implies it (the butler may have a twin etc).

The 32 ideas from 'Varieties of Things'

7923 'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred? [Macdonald,C]
7926 We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C]
7965 Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C]
7927 At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law [Macdonald,C]
7928 The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true [Macdonald,C]
7936 Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity [Macdonald,C]
7930 The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles [Macdonald,C]
7932 A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C]
7937 When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C]
7939 Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C]
7940 A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C]
7929 A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence [Macdonald,C]
7941 Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular [Macdonald,C]
7942 The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change [Macdonald,C]
7943 A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible [Macdonald,C]
7938 Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances [Macdonald,C]
7934 Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C]
7944 Reduce by bridge laws (plus property identities?), by elimination, or by reducing talk [Macdonald,C]
7947 In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself [Macdonald,C]
7948 A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical [Macdonald,C]
7933 Don't assume that a thing has all the properties of its parts [Macdonald,C]
7950 Philosophy tries to explain how the actual is possible, given that it seems impossible [Macdonald,C]
7958 Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C]
7967 Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations [Macdonald,C]
7955 Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C]
7961 A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once [Macdonald,C]
7959 How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way? [Macdonald,C]
7960 Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C]
7951 Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity? [Macdonald,C]
7964 How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C]
7971 Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets [Macdonald,C]
7972 Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C]