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Single Idea 5257

[filed under theme 20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will ]

Full Idea

The licentious man is unrepentant, because he abides by his choice; but the incontinent (weak-willed) man is always capable of repentance.

Gist of Idea

Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance

Source

Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1150b28)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Ethics (Nicomachean)', ed/tr. ThomsonJ A K/TredennickH [Penguin 1976], p.244

A Reaction

This is the very important feature of virtue theory - that what happens AFTER the action is almost as important as what happens before and during it. Character can be revealed just as much by pride or regret for an action.

The 30 ideas with the same theme [failing to perform the action which is judged best]:

22511 Some reasonings are stronger than we are [Philolaus]
5843 People do what they think they should do, and only ever do what they think they should do [Socrates, by Xenophon]
5253 Socrates was shocked by the idea of akrasia, but observation shows that it happens [Aristotle on Socrates]
195 No one willingly commits an evil or base act [Socrates]
199 The common belief is that people can know the best without acting on it [Socrates]
1653 Socrates did not accept the tripartite soul (which permits akrasia) [Vlastos on Socrates]
24060 Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle]
4383 Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
68 The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire [Aristotle]
4318 Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action. [Aristotle, by Cottingham]
4372 Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
5254 Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge [Aristotle]
5255 A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular [Aristotle]
23317 Aristotle sees akrasia as acting against what is chosen, not against reason [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
23318 Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
5257 Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance [Aristotle]
23918 Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle]
22574 A community can lack self-control [Aristotle]
20850 Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
19365 Limited awareness leads to bad choices, and unconscious awareness makes us choose the bad [Leibniz, by Perkins]
22098 Socrates neglects the gap between knowing what is good and doing good [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
24117 We need lower and higher drives, but they must be under firm control [Nietzsche]
7209 There is no will; weakness of will is splitting of impulses, strong will is coordination under one impulse [Nietzsche]
23878 Weakness of will is the inadequacy of the original impetus to carry through the action [Weil]
6385 The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best [Davidson]
4317 We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham]
23996 Akrasia is intelligible in hindsight, when we revisit our previous emotions [Blackburn]
4355 There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends [Hursthouse]
23995 Akrasia can be either overruling our deliberation, or failing to deliberate [Goldie]
20077 If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R]