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Full Idea
One venerable tradition, exemplified in Aquinas, has it that matter is the 'principle of individuation', that is, that all that can be guaranteed to distinguish two concrete thing of the same kind is the different matter of which they are composed.
Gist of Idea
One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter
Source
E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.5)
Book Ref
Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.200
A Reaction
This seems to be 'identity-conditions' rather than 'individuation', according to Idea 7926. The problem would be how to identify that particular matter, apart from its composing that particular object. Replacing planks on a ship seems unimportant.
Related Idea
Idea 7926 We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C]
| 17848 | Things such as two different quadrangles are alike but not wholly the same [Aristotle] |
| 10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
| 13945 | A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R] |
| 6043 | Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn] |
| 6044 | Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn] |
| 6046 | Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn] |
| 6045 | It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn] |
| 8290 | One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe] |
| 13920 | Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe] |
| 6157 | Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands] |
| 4647 | 'I have the same car as you' is fine; 'I have the same fiancée as you' is not so good [Baggini /Fosl] |