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Single Idea 4635

[filed under theme 2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic ]

Full Idea

Dialectic can be said to aim at wholeness or unity, while 'analytic' thinking divides that with which it deals into parts.

Gist of Idea

Dialectic aims at unified truth, unlike analysis, which divides into parts

Source

J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §2.03)

Book Ref

Baggini,J and Fosl,P.S.: 'The Philosopher's Toolkit' [Blackwells 2003], p.44

A Reaction

I don't accept this division (linked here to Hegel). I am a fan of analysis, as practised by Aristotle, but it is like dismantling an engine to identify and clean the parts, before reassembling it more efficiently.

The 18 ideas from J Baggini / PS Fosl

4582 Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed [Baggini /Fosl]
4584 The problem of induction is how to justify our belief in the uniformity of nature [Baggini /Fosl]
4583 How can an argument be good induction, but poor deduction? [Baggini /Fosl]
4629 Consistency is the cornerstone of rationality [Baggini /Fosl]
4632 'Natural' systems of deduction are based on normal rational practice, rather than on axioms [Baggini /Fosl]
4631 In ideal circumstances, an axiom should be such that no rational agent could possibly object to its use [Baggini /Fosl]
4633 You cannot rationally deny the principle of non-contradiction, because all reasoning requires it [Baggini /Fosl]
4634 Abduction aims at simplicity, testability, coherence and comprehensiveness [Baggini /Fosl]
4635 Dialectic aims at unified truth, unlike analysis, which divides into parts [Baggini /Fosl]
4637 To see if an explanation is the best, it is necessary to investigate the alternative explanations [Baggini /Fosl]
4638 The principle of bivalence distorts reality, as when claiming that a person is or is not 'thin' [Baggini /Fosl]
4639 Leibniz's Law is about the properties of objects; the Identity of Indiscernibles is about perception of objects [Baggini /Fosl]
4640 If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [Baggini /Fosl, by PG]
4643 The Principle of Sufficient Reason does not presuppose that all explanations will be causal explanations [Baggini /Fosl]
4644 A proposition such as 'some swans are purple' cannot be falsified, only verified [Baggini /Fosl]
4646 Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori? [Baggini /Fosl]
4645 'A priori' does not concern how you learn a proposition, but how you show whether it is true or false [Baggini /Fosl]
4647 'I have the same car as you' is fine; 'I have the same fiancée as you' is not so good [Baggini /Fosl]