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Single Idea 20763

[filed under theme 23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability ]

Full Idea

Freedom as the definition of man does not depend on others, but as soon as there is involvement, I am obliged to want others to have freedom at the same time that I want my own freedom.

Gist of Idea

When my personal freedom becomes involved, I must want freedom for everyone else

Source

Jean-Paul Sartre (Existentialism and Humanism [1945], p.306), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 7 'Anything'

Book Ref

Aho,Kevin: 'Existentialism: an introduction' [Polity 2014], p.108

A Reaction

Appears to be a highly Kantian sense of rational duty, and a rather odd constraint on someone whose only value is freedom. Sartre is aware that he needs an existential politics, but he's not there yet. 'Involvement' is an interesting addition to Kant.

The 22 ideas with the same theme [seeing rules for action as universal guidelines]:

23396 Mozi condemns partiality, which is the cause of all the great harms in the world [Mozi]
23397 Those who are against impartiality still prefer impartial protectors [Mozi]
6031 The essence of propriety is consistency [Cicero]
4853 Rational people are self-interested, but also desire the same goods for other people [Spinoza]
4858 A rational person will want others to have the goods he seeks for himself [Spinoza]
8026 Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre on Kant]
6185 No one would lend money unless a universal law made it secure, even after death [Kant]
6187 Universality determines the will, and hence extends self-love into altruism [Kant]
8029 You can't have a morality which is supplied by the individual, but is also genuinely universal [Hegel, by MacIntyre]
20763 When my personal freedom becomes involved, I must want freedom for everyone else [Sartre]
2710 Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]
22409 We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty [Williams,B]
4122 If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests [Williams,B]
4121 Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws? [Williams,B]
21051 Check your rationality by thinking of your opinion pronounced by the supreme court [Rawls]
6446 In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel]
3282 The general form of moral reasoning is putting yourself in other people's shoes [Nagel]
3294 As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel]
3254 If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory [Nagel]
3264 We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values [Nagel]
4285 As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton]
15674 One can universalise good advice, but that doesn't make it an obligation [Finlayson]