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Single Idea 15048

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality ]

Full Idea

The first main approach says metaphysical reality is to be identified with what is 'objective' or 'factual'. ...According to the second conception, metaphysical reality is to be identified with what is 'irreducible' or 'fundamental'.

Gist of Idea

In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental'

Source

Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 1)

Book Ref

-: 'Philosophers' Imprint' [-], p.3


A Reaction

Fine is defending the 'fundamental' approach, via the 'grounding' relation. The whole structure, though, seems to be reality. In particular, a complete story must include the relations which facilitate more than mere fundamentals.


The 17 ideas from 'The Question of Realism'

If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K]
Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K]
What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K]
In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K]
Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider]
Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K]
Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K]
Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K]
'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K]
If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K]
Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K]
Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K]
The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K]
A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K]
Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K]
Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K]
Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K]