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Single Idea 3408

[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth ]

Full Idea

States that have the same intrinsic properties - the same neural/physical properties - may have different contents if they are embedded in different environments.

Gist of Idea

Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds

Source

Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.146)

Book Ref

Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.146


A Reaction

This is a way of expressing externalism. It depends what you mean by 'contents'. I struggle to see how "H2O" could be the content of the word 'water' among ancient Greeks.


The 20 ideas with the same theme [we may not know what we mean by 'water']:

We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G on Putnam]
Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey]
If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane]
'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this [Putnam]
Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam]
Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson]
Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim]
Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim]
What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori [Harré/Madden]
XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor]
If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor]
Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré]
The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane]
Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe]
If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
That water is essentially H2O in some way concerns how we use 'water' [Sidelle]
Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter]
Water must be related to water, just as tigers must be related to tigers [Almog]