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Single Idea 6633

[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth ]

Full Idea

The implication of considerations of Twin Earth cases is that even beliefs about the properties of kinds of stuff are implicitly indexical, or context-dependent, in character.

Clarification

'Indexical' statements depend on context for meaning

Gist of Idea

Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical

Source

E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4)

Book Ref

Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.82

A Reaction

This is a significant connection, between debates about the nature of indexicals (such as 'I' and 'this') and externalism about content generally. Is there no distinction between objective reference and contextual reference?

The 198 ideas from E.J. Lowe

18351 Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe]
18352 Tropes have existence independently of any entities [Lowe]
18353 Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals [Lowe]
8967 Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe]
8968 If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole [Lowe]
8965 Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination [Lowe]
8966 Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction [Lowe]
15541 Maybe particles are unchanging, and intrinsic change in things is their rearrangement [Lowe, by Lewis]
7710 Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
7711 Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
7712 On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
7714 Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
7715 Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
7722 If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
7720 Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
16414 Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions [Lowe, by Hofweber]
16063 Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow]
8258 Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe]
9414 Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities [Lowe, by Mumford]
8260 Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe]
8267 Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality [Lowe]
8265 Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value [Lowe]
8263 An object is an entity which has identity-conditions [Lowe]
8262 How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? [Lowe]
8266 Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous [Lowe]
8268 Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity [Lowe]
8269 Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them [Lowe]
8270 Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe]
8271 An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times [Lowe]
8272 How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes? [Lowe]
8273 Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? [Lowe]
8275 Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects [Lowe]
8276 Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual [Lowe]
8279 The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin? [Lowe]
8280 While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change [Lowe]
8281 Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe]
8283 Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe]
8282 Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change [Lowe]
8284 The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe]
8286 Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects [Lowe]
8285 I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe]
8288 Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe]
8290 One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe]
8292 Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence [Lowe]
8291 Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe]
8289 The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe]
8293 Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature [Lowe]
8294 How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? [Lowe]
8295 Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? [Lowe]
8296 Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? [Lowe]
16127 Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is [Lowe]
16128 A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects [Lowe]
16130 To be an object at all requires identity-conditions [Lowe]
16131 The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit [Lowe]
15079 'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe]
8297 Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality [Lowe]
8298 Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa [Lowe]
8299 Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts [Lowe]
8300 Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe]
8301 Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe]
8302 Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another [Lowe]
8305 A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe]
8303 Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types [Lowe]
8306 You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable [Lowe]
8307 Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe]
8308 Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe]
8309 A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members [Lowe]
8310 Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do? [Lowe]
8311 If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2 [Lowe]
8312 It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation [Lowe]
8313 Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe]
8315 Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe]
8314 Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe]
8316 Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe]
8317 To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe]
8318 The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe]
8319 One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe]
8320 Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe]
8321 All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe]
8322 I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions [Lowe]
8323 It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe]
13122 Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff]
6617 The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe]
6631 If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe]
6619 Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe]
6618 A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe]
6626 'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe]
6625 If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe]
6623 Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe]
6628 Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe]
6629 Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe]
6621 You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe]
6622 Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe]
6630 Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe]
6634 Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe]
6632 The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe]
6636 The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe]
6633 Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe]
6635 Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe]
6637 How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe]
6642 Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe]
6646 The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe]
6643 'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe]
6639 The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe]
6640 A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe]
6645 If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe]
6638 One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe]
6644 Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe]
6641 Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe]
6647 Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe]
6648 Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe]
6653 Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe]
6656 The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe]
6652 'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe]
6651 People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe]
6655 The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe]
6654 A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe]
6657 Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe]
6659 The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe]
6661 Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe]
6662 We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe]
6663 People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe]
6666 All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe]
6665 Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe]
6670 If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe]
6671 It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe]
6667 There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe]
16531 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe]
16532 'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe]
16533 Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe]
16534 'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe]
16535 A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe]
16547 H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe]
16543 If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe]
16544 Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe]
16538 We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe]
16542 Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe]
16545 The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe]
16546 The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe]
16539 A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe]
16540 Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe]
16548 An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe]
16549 Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe]
16551 Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe]
16552 If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe]
16550 Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe]
14581 The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members [Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum]
4205 'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe]
4195 It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe]
4206 Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump? [Lowe]
4207 We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe]
4196 The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe]
4197 The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe]
4208 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe]
4209 The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe]
4210 If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe]
4211 Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe]
4212 Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe]
4213 Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe]
4214 Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe]
4194 Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole [Lowe]
4193 The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation [Lowe]
4215 It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe]
4217 It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe]
4219 Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe]
4220 Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe]
4221 Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe]
4222 If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? [Lowe]
4223 Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics [Lowe]
4224 If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects [Lowe]
4225 Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe]
4227 Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract [Lowe]
4198 If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship [Lowe]
4228 If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects? [Lowe]
4199 A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist [Lowe]
4229 An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member [Lowe]
4200 If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship). [Lowe]
4232 Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe]
4233 If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe]
4234 Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe]
4235 Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe]
4236 Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe]
4237 Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations [Lowe]
4238 The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location [Lowe]
4239 Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe]
4241 If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects [Lowe]
4240 It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth [Lowe]
4201 Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG]
4202 Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe]
4203 Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe]
4204 Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material [Lowe]
7783 Bodies, properties, relations, events, numbers, sets and propositions are 'things' if they exist [Lowe]
13917 Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe]
13919 Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe]
13918 Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe]
13921 All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe]
13922 Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe]
13920 Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe]