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Single Idea 6633

[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth ]

Full Idea

The implication of considerations of Twin Earth cases is that even beliefs about the properties of kinds of stuff are implicitly indexical, or context-dependent, in character.

Clarification

'Indexical' statements depend on context for meaning

Gist of Idea

Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical

Source

E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4)

Book Ref

Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.82


A Reaction

This is a significant connection, between debates about the nature of indexicals (such as 'I' and 'this') and externalism about content generally. Is there no distinction between objective reference and contextual reference?


The 20 ideas with the same theme [we may not know what we mean by 'water']:

We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G on Putnam]
Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey]
If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane]
'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this [Putnam]
Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam]
Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson]
Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim]
Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim]
What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori [Harré/Madden]
XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor]
If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor]
Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré]
The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane]
Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe]
If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
That water is essentially H2O in some way concerns how we use 'water' [Sidelle]
Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter]
Water must be related to water, just as tigers must be related to tigers [Almog]