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Single Idea 14766

[filed under theme 14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory ]

Full Idea

The works of Duns Scotus have strongly influenced me. …His logic and metaphysics, torn away from its medievalism, …will go far toward supplying the philosophy which is best to harmonize with physical science.

Gist of Idea

Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science

Source

Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.2)

Book Ref

Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Philosophical Writings of Peirce', ed/tr. Buchler,Justus [Dover 1940], p.2

The 117 ideas from Charles Sanders Peirce

14790 'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others [Peirce]
14791 Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction [Peirce]
14303 Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false [Peirce]
14799 Metaphysics rests on observations, but ones so common we hardly notice them [Peirce]
14800 The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity [Peirce]
14801 Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results [Peirce]
14802 Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce]
14764 I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce]
14767 The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce]
14765 Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce]
14766 Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce]
14768 Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce]
14797 Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce]
14798 All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce]
14803 The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce]
14804 Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce]
14805 Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce]
14806 If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce]
14792 A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life [Peirce]
14793 The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications [Peirce]
14794 Instead of seeking Truth, we should seek belief that is beyond doubt [Peirce]
21492 Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
6598 We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
6937 Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce]
6939 What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce]
6938 Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
6940 The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
6941 We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
6942 We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
6943 A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
6944 Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
6945 Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
6946 If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce]
6947 Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
6948 Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
6949 If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]
19087 The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce]
14781 A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed [Peirce]
7634 Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional [Peirce, by Maund]
14906 Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce]
19089 Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce]
7660 We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce]
7661 Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce]
14789 Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce]
14782 Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce]
14783 Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce]
14784 Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce]
14787 Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce]
14785 The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce]
14786 Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce]
14788 Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce]
15335 Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce]
14795 Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce]
14796 Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce]
19231 Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce]
19229 Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce]
19219 Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce]
19228 Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce]
19227 Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce]
19218 Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce]
19223 We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce]
19226 We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce]
19224 Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce]
19225 I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce]
19222 Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce]
19220 We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce]
19230 People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce]
19221 Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce]
19234 'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce]
19235 How does induction get started? [Peirce]
19236 Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce]
19233 Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce]
19232 In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce]
19240 Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce]
19239 There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce]
19241 An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce]
19238 The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce]
19237 Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce]
19242 Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce]
19245 We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce]
19244 Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce]
19243 If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce]
19246 'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce]
19247 The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce]
19250 Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce]
19251 The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce]
19249 'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce]
19248 Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce]
19252 Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce]
19255 Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce]
19253 We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce]
19254 Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce]
19257 Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce]
19256 Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce]
14769 Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce]
14775 Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce]
14776 That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce]
14771 Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce]
14773 A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce]
14770 Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce]
14772 If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce]
14774 Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce]
14778 Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce]
14777 That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce]
14779 I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce]
14780 Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce]
19097 Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak]
19102 Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak]
21494 If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce]
19095 Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak]
21489 Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin]
10352 The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce]
16376 The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce]
21491 Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin]
13498 Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD]
19107 Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce]
21493 Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce]