more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 19091

[filed under theme 14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory ]

Full Idea

As mathematically understood, the world is not an object of experience but instead an object of thought.

Gist of Idea

Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience

Source

Danielle Macbeth (Pragmatism and Objective Truth [2007], p.183)

Book Ref

'New Pragmatists', ed/tr. Misak,Cheryl [OUP 2009], p.183


A Reaction

Since I am keen on citing biology to show that science does not have to be mathematical, this nicely shows that there is something wrong with a science which places a large gap between itself and the world.


The 39 ideas with the same theme [a generalised explanation of natural events]:

Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
General statements about nature are not valid [Novalis]
You have only begun to do real science when you can express it in numbers [Kelvin]
Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce]
I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce]
There is no one scientific method; we must try many approaches, and many emotions [Nietzsche]
The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline [Frege]
Mathematically expressed propositions are true of the world, but how to interpret them? [Russell]
Carnap tried to define all scientific predicates in terms of primitive relations, using type theory [Carnap, by Button]
It seems obvious to prefer the simpler of two theories, on grounds of beauty and convenience [Quine]
There are four suspicious reasons why we prefer simpler theories [Quine]
Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another [Quine, by Baggini /Fosl]
Kuhn came to accept that all scientists agree on a particular set of values [Kuhn, by Bird]
Since there are three different dimensions for generalising laws, no one system of logic can cover them [Harré]
Identities like 'heat is molecule motion' are necessary (in the highest degree), not contingent [Kripke]
Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden]
Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden]
The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden]
Social sciences discover no law-like generalisations, and tend to ignore counterexamples [MacIntyre]
Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith]
Theories can never represent accurately, because their components are abstract [Cartwright,N, by Portides]
Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor]
If we make a hypothesis about data, then a deduction, where does the hypothesis come from? [Lipton]
If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent [Heil]
Neither a priori rationalism nor sense data empiricism account for scientific knowledge [Thagard]
The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs [Orenstein]
Relativity ousted Newtonian mechanics despite a loss of simplicity [Bird]
Realists say their theories involve truth and the existence of their phenomena [Bird]
There is no agreement on scientific method - because there is no such thing [Bird]
How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux]
Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth]
Theories with unobservables are underdetermined by the evidence [Okasha]
Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind [Machery]
If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification [Machery]
Vertical arguments say eliminate a term if it picks out different natural kinds in different theories [Machery]
Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham]
Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham]
Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham]
Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter]