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Single Idea 6805

[filed under theme 14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory ]

Full Idea

The theories of relativity ousted Newtonian mechanics despite a loss of simplicity.

Gist of Idea

Relativity ousted Newtonian mechanics despite a loss of simplicity

Source

Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998])

Book Ref

Bird,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Science' [UCL Press 2000], p.264

A Reaction

This nicely demonstrates that simplicity is not essential, even if it is desirable. The point applies to the use of Ockham's Razor (Idea 6806), and to Hume's objection to miracles (Idea 2227), where strange unnatural events may be the truth.

Related Ideas

Idea 6806 Do not multiply entities beyond necessity [William of Ockham]

Idea 2227 A miracle violates laws which have been established by continuous unchanging experience, so should be ignored [Hume]

Idea 15283 Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden]

Idea 21688 There are four suspicious reasons why we prefer simpler theories [Quine]

The 98 ideas from Alexander Bird

17526 The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and pre-condition [Bird]
17528 The dispositional account explains causation, as stimulation and manifestation of dispositions [Bird]
17527 Causation seems to be an innate concept (or acquired very early) [Bird]
14540 Only real powers are fundamental [Bird, by Mumford/Anjum]
23713 Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers [Bird, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
9450 If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird]
9449 The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world [Bird]
9507 Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences [Bird]
9473 Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird]
9472 Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird]
9474 A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out [Bird]
9475 A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break [Bird]
9477 Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird]
9482 If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity [Bird]
9481 Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility [Bird]
9479 Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities [Bird]
9484 If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird]
9486 Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird]
9487 We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B [Bird]
9488 Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties [Bird]
9489 Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird]
9490 The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird]
9491 Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence [Bird]
9493 We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation [Bird]
9494 Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws [Bird]
9495 If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird]
9496 That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is [Bird]
9492 Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird]
9498 The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird]
9499 Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions [Bird]
9501 If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects [Bird]
9500 If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched [Bird]
9502 There might be just one fundamental natural property [Bird]
9503 To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate [Bird]
9504 The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be [Bird]
9505 Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote [Bird]
9506 Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible [Bird]
6807 In Newton mass is conserved, but in Einstein it can convert into energy [Bird]
6805 Relativity ousted Newtonian mechanics despite a loss of simplicity [Bird]
6738 Any conclusion can be drawn from an induction, if we use grue-like predicates [Bird]
6739 Several months of observing beech trees supports the deciduous and evergreen hypotheses [Bird]
6745 A regularity is only a law if it is part of a complete system which is simple and strong [Bird]
6746 There may be many laws, each with only a few instances [Bird]
6740 'All uranium lumps are small' is a law, but 'all gold lumps are small' is not [Bird]
6741 There can be remarkable uniformities in nature that are purely coincidental [Bird]
6742 A law might have no instances, if it was about things that only exist momentarily [Bird]
6743 If laws are just instances, the law should either have gaps, or join the instances arbitrarily [Bird]
6744 Where is the regularity in a law predicting nuclear decay? [Bird]
6747 Laws cannot explain instances if they are regularities, as something can't explain itself [Bird]
6748 Similar appearance of siblings is a regularity, but shared parents is what links them [Bird]
6749 We can only infer a true regularity if something binds the instances together [Bird]
6754 We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things [Bird]
6761 Contrastive explanations say why one thing happened but not another [Bird]
6757 Explanation predicts after the event; prediction explains before the event [Bird]
6752 The objective component of explanations is the things that must exist for the explanation [Bird]
6753 Laws are more fundamental in science than causes, and laws will explain causes [Bird]
6762 Newton's laws cannot be confirmed individually, but only in combinations [Bird]
6763 Parapsychology is mere speculation, because it offers no mechanisms for its working [Bird]
6750 Explanations are causal, nomic, psychological, psychoanalytic, Darwinian or functional [Bird]
6758 'Covering law' explanations only work if no other explanations are to be found [Bird]
6759 Livers always accompany hearts, but they don't explain hearts [Bird]
6756 Probabilistic-statistical explanations don't entail the explanandum, but makes it more likely [Bird]
6760 An operation might reduce the probability of death, yet explain a death [Bird]
6751 Maybe explanation is so subjective that it cannot be a part of science [Bird]
6773 If F is a universal appearing in a natural law, then Fs form a natural kind [Bird]
6772 Existence requires laws, as inertia or gravity are needed for mass or matter [Bird]
6769 In the Kripke-Putnam view only nuclear physicists can know natural kinds [Bird]
6774 Darwinism suggests that we should have a native ability to detect natural kinds [Bird]
6776 Natural kinds are those that we use in induction [Bird]
6767 Rubies and sapphires are both corundum, with traces of metals varying their colours [Bird]
6768 Tin is not one natural kind, but appears to be 21, depending on isotope [Bird]
6771 Natural kinds may overlap, or be sub-kinds of one another [Bird]
6770 Membership of a purely random collection cannot be used as an explanation [Bird]
6764 Nominal essence of a natural kind is the features that make it fit its name [Bird]
6766 Jadeite and nephrite are superficially identical, but have different composition [Bird]
6775 Induction is inference to the best explanation, where the explanation is a law [Bird]
6786 As science investigates more phenomena, the theories it needs decreases [Bird]
6779 Instrumentalists say distinctions between observation and theory vanish with ostensive definition [Bird]
6780 Anti-realism is more plausible about laws than about entities and theories [Bird]
6777 Realists say their theories involve truth and the existence of their phenomena [Bird]
6778 Instrumentalists regard theories as tools for prediction, with truth being irrelevant [Bird]
6785 Inference to the Best Explanation is done with facts, so it has to be realist [Bird]
6788 Maybe bad explanations are the true ones, in this messy world [Bird]
6787 Which explanation is 'best' is bound to be subjective, and no guide to truth [Bird]
6791 If Hume is right about induction, there is no scientific knowledge [Bird]
6790 Anything justifying inferences from observed to unobserved must itself do that [Bird]
6792 If theories need observation, and observations need theories, how do we start? [Bird]
6789 If flame colour is characteristic of a metal, that is an empirical claim needing justification [Bird]
6796 Subjective probability measures personal beliefs; objective probability measures the chance of an event happening [Bird]
6797 Objective probability of tails measures the bias of the coin, not our beliefs about it [Bird]
6798 Bayesianism claims to find rationality and truth in induction, and show how science works [Bird]
6800 Many philosophers rate justification as a more important concept than knowledge [Bird]
6799 We normally learn natural kinds from laws, but Goodman shows laws require prior natural kinds [Bird]
6804 There is no agreement on scientific method - because there is no such thing [Bird]
6808 Reference to scientific terms is by explanatory role, not by descriptions [Bird]
6802 With strange enough predicates, anything could be made out to be a regularity [Bird]
6803 If we only infer laws from regularities among observations, we can't infer unobservable entities. [Bird]
6801 Accidental regularities are not laws, and an apparent regularity may not be actual [Bird]