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Single Idea 7000
[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
]
Full Idea
'Centralists' (e.g. Bernard Williams) say thin ethical concepts (right, good, ought) are conceptually fundamental; 'non-centralists' (e.g. Susan Hurley) say that such concepts are not conceptually prior to kindness, equity and the like.
Gist of Idea
Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.?
Source
Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.5)
Book Ref
Jackson,Frank: 'From Metaphysics to Ethics' [OUP 2000], p.136
A Reaction
My immediate intuition is to side with Susan Hurley, since morality grows out of immediate relationships, not out of intellectual principles and theoretical generalisations. This would go with particularist views of virtue theory.
The
27 ideas
from 'From Metaphysics to Ethics'
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6979
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Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences
[Jackson]
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7005
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Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account
[Jackson]
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6977
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Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so
[Jackson]
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6975
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Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties
[Jackson]
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6976
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In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around
[Jackson]
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6982
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Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible
[Jackson]
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6980
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Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story
[Jackson]
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6983
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Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis
[Jackson]
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6991
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We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect
[Jackson]
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6984
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Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level
[Jackson]
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6987
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We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity
[Jackson]
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6986
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Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori?
[Jackson]
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6990
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Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water'
[Jackson]
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6985
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Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases
[Jackson]
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6989
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I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions
[Jackson]
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6988
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Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework
[Jackson]
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6993
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Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans
[Jackson]
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6992
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If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible
[Jackson]
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6998
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Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing
[Jackson]
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6997
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Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality
[Jackson]
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7000
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Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.?
[Jackson]
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6999
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It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide
[Jackson]
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6995
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Successful predication supervenes on nature
[Jackson]
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6996
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Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output
[Jackson]
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6994
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Truth supervenes on being
[Jackson]
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6978
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Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter
[Jackson]
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14707
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Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings
[Jackson, by Schroeter]
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