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Single Idea 15784
[filed under theme 2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
]
Full Idea
A Meinongian has already posited everything that could, or even could not, be; how, then, can any subsequent brandishing of Ockham's Razor be to the point?
Gist of Idea
The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist
Source
William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 02)
Book Ref
'The Possible and the Actual', ed/tr. Loux,Michael J. [Cornell 1979], p.279
A Reaction
See the ideas of Alexius Meinong. Presumably these crazy Meinongians must make some distinction between what actually exists in front of your nose, and the rest. So the Razor can use that distinction too.
The
43 ideas
from William Lycan
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6527
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If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws
[Lycan]
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6528
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In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals
[Lycan]
|
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6529
|
I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics
[Lycan]
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6531
|
Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens
[Lycan]
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6532
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Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens
[Lycan]
|
|
6534
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One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy
[Lycan]
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6535
|
Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones
[Lycan]
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6533
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Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction
[Lycan]
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6530
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We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose
[Lycan]
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6536
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Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws
[Lycan]
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6537
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Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories
[Lycan]
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|
6539
|
The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing
[Lycan]
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6538
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We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees
[Lycan]
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|
6541
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Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic
[Lycan]
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6545
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If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function
[Lycan]
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6542
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A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations
[Lycan]
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6543
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Intentionality comes in degrees
[Lycan]
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6544
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Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction
[Lycan]
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6546
|
Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction
[Lycan]
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6547
|
The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false
[Lycan]
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6549
|
I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects
[Lycan]
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|
6548
|
Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory
[Lycan]
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|
6551
|
'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time
[Lycan]
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|
6554
|
Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?"
[Lycan]
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5501
|
People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms
[Lycan]
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5494
|
'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities
[Lycan]
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5496
|
Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental
[Lycan]
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5499
|
A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism
[Lycan]
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5500
|
Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above
[Lycan]
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7755
|
Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc.
[Lycan]
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|
7763
|
It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name
[Lycan]
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|
7764
|
Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it?
[Lycan]
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|
7766
|
Meaning must be known before we can consider verification
[Lycan]
|
|
7768
|
The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation
[Lycan]
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|
7770
|
Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate'
[Lycan]
|
|
7773
|
A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true
[Lycan]
|
|
7774
|
Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation
[Lycan]
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|
15784
|
The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist
[Lycan]
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|
15787
|
Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle
[Lycan]
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|
15792
|
Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties
[Lycan]
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|
15795
|
Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events
[Lycan]
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15794
|
If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility
[Lycan]
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|
15796
|
Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties
[Lycan]
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