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Single Idea 2703

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism ]

Full Idea

Ethical descriptivism is the view that ethical sentence-meaning is wholly determined by truth-conditions. …Prescriptivists think there is a further element of meaning, which expresses prescriptions or evaluations or attitudes which we assent to.

Gist of Idea

Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation

Source

Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.452)

Book Ref

'A Companion to Ethics', ed/tr. Singer,Peter [Blackwell 1993], p.452

A Reaction

Not sure I understand either of these. If all meaning consists of truth-conditions, that will apply to ethics. If meaning includes evaluations, that will apply to non-ethics.

The 20 ideas from Richard M. Hare

22331 Moral statements are imperatives rather than the avowals of emotion - but universalisable [Hare, by Glock]
22484 Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism [Hare, by Foot]
6449 The categorical imperative leads to utilitarianism [Hare, by Nagel]
2855 In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hare, by Hooker,B]
16050 The goodness of a picture supervenes on the picture; duplicates must be equally good [Hare]
4125 Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B]
4126 If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare]
4127 If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare]
4360 By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright [Hare]
22483 A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare]
2703 Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
2704 If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
2705 How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
2706 Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
2707 If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
2708 An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
2709 Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
2710 Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]
2711 Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
2712 You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]