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Single Idea 19249

[filed under theme 16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self ]

Full Idea

'Know thyself' does not mean instrospect your soul. It means see yourself as others would see you if they were intimate enough with you.

Gist of Idea

'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you

Source

Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], V)

Book Ref

Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Reasoning and the Logic of Things', ed/tr. Ketner,K.L. [Harvard 1992], p.186


A Reaction

When it comes to anger management, I would have thought that introspection had some use. You can see a tantrum coming before even your intimates can. Nice disagreement with Sartre! (Idea 7123)

Related Idea

Idea 7123 Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre]


The 40 ideas from 'Reasoning and the Logic of Things'

Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce]
Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce]
Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce]
Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce]
Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce]
Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce]
We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce]
We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce]
I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce]
Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce]
Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce]
We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce]
People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce]
Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce]
Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce]
In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce]
'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce]
How does induction get started? [Peirce]
Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce]
Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce]
The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce]
Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce]
There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce]
An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce]
Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce]
The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce]
'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce]
We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce]
Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce]
If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce]
The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce]
'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce]
Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce]
Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce]
Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce]
We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce]
Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce]
Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce]
Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce]
Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce]