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Single Idea 6636
[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
]
Full Idea
The leading naturalistic theories of what it is that confers a specific content upon a given attitudinal state are the causal theory, and the teleological theory, both of which contain serious difficulties.
Clarification
'Teleology' concerns purposes
Gist of Idea
The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory
Source
E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4)
Book Ref
Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.101
A Reaction
'Causal' theories (Fodor) say the world directly causes content; 'teleological' theories (Millikan, Papineau) are based on the evolutionary purpose of content for the subject. I agree that neither seems adequate…
The
26 ideas
with the same theme
[how minds internally represent reality]:
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21541
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The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object
[Russell]
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6164
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Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features
[Sartre, by Rowlands]
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3492
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Content is much more than just sentence meaning
[Searle]
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6977
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Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so
[Jackson]
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4889
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Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change
[Perry]
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23794
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Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual
[Evans, by Schulte]
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23803
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States have content if we can predict them well by assuming intentionality
[Dennett, by Schulte]
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3708
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All thought represents either properties or indexicals
[Bonjour]
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2983
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Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so
[Lyons on Fodor]
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3115
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Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing?
[Burge, by Segal]
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3147
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Problem-solving clearly involves manipulating images
[Rey]
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3175
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Animals map things over time as well as over space
[Rey]
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2977
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All thinking has content
[Lyons]
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15588
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You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved
[Fine,K]
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6636
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The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory
[Lowe]
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6168
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The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence
[Rowlands]
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7637
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Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts
[Maund, by PG]
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16381
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The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers)
[Recanati]
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18035
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Two sentences with different meanings can, on occasion, have the same content
[Magidor]
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19264
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Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental
[Vaidya]
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23806
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Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science
[Schulte]
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23792
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Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united
[Schulte]
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23793
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On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow
[Schulte]
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23796
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Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented
[Schulte]
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23795
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Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions
[Schulte]
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23804
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Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties
[Schulte]
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