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Full Idea
There is no guarantee that events made for semantics are the same as events that are causes and effects.
Gist of Idea
The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation
Source
David Lewis (Events [1986], I)
Book Ref
Lewis,David: 'Philosophical Papers Vol.2' [OUP 1986], p.241
A Reaction
This little cri de couer could be a motto for a huge amount of analytic philosophy, which (for some odd reason) thought that mathematics, logic, set theory and formal semantics were good tools for explaining nature.
| 15561 | The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis] |
| 15562 | Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis] |
| 15564 | An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis] |
| 15563 | Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis] |
| 15565 | Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis] |
| 15566 | Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis] |
| 15567 | Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis] |