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Single Idea 8270

[filed under theme 7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events ]

Full Idea

My own broadly Aristotelian view is that events are changes (and unchanges) in the properties and relations of persisting objects.

Gist of Idea

Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects

Source

E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 4.4)

Book Ref

Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.97


A Reaction

This needs an account of what it is that persists, and the philosophers' (but not physicists') concept of 'substance' fills this role. It is rather hard to give identity-conditions for an event if it is an 'unchange'. How would you count such events?


The 17 ideas with the same theme [what we should take events to consist of]:

Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times [Chisholm]
Maybe each event has only one possible causal history [Bennett]
Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it [Bennett]
We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan]
Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson]
Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis]
Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis]
Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis]
Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis]
If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist [Benardete,JA]
Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe]
Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe]
Einstein's relativity brought events into ontology, as the terms of a simultaneity relationships [Simons]
Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time [Merricks]
I do not think there is a general identity condition for events [Simons]
Events are essentially changes; property exemplifications are just states of affairs [Mumford/Anjum]