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Single Idea 8533

[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates ]

Full Idea

Must there not be something quite specific about the thing which allows, indeed ensures, that predicates like 'underneath' and 'hot' apply? The predicates require ontological correlates.

Gist of Idea

Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply

Source

David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §1)

Book Ref

'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.164


A Reaction

An interesting proposal, that in addition to making use of predicates, we should 'ensure that they apply'. Sounds verificationist. Obvious problem cases would be speculative, controversial or metaphorical predicates. "He's beneath contempt".


The 17 ideas from 'Properties'

What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver]
Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong]
There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong]
Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong]
To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong]
Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong]
Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong]
Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong]
We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong]
In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong]
Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong]
Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong]
Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong]
The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong]
Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong]
Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong]
Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong]