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Single Idea 7376

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia ]

Full Idea

The goal of the experiment was to describe a case in which it was obvious that the qualia would be inverted while the reactive dispositions would be normalized. But the assumption that one could just tell is question-begging.

Gist of Idea

We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted

Source

Daniel C. Dennett (Consciousness Explained [1991], 12.4)

Book Ref

Dennett,Daniel C.: 'Consciousness Explained' [Penguin 1993], p.397

A Reaction

It certainly seems simple and plausible that if we inverted our experience of traffic light colours, no difference in driver behaviour would be seen. However, my example, of a conversation in a gallery of abstract art, seems more problematic.

Related Idea

Idea 4107 With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane]

The 24 ideas from 'Consciousness Explained'

7365 Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up [Dennett]
7366 It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious [Dennett]
7367 Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking. [Dennett]
7369 Brains are essentially anticipation machines [Dennett]
7368 Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes [Dennett]
7370 The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits [Dennett]
7371 All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another [Dennett]
7372 In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special [Dennett]
7373 Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information [Dennett]
7374 Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours [Dennett]
7376 We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted [Dennett]
7379 If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett]
7380 Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing [Dennett]
7383 The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain [Dennett]
7381 We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are [Dennett]
7382 We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them [Dennett]
7386 Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes [Dennett]
7385 People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing [Dennett]
7384 Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences' [Dennett]
7387 "Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states [Dennett]
7393 We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious [Dennett]
7391 We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown [Dennett]
7394 Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events [Dennett]
14308 We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Dennett, by Mumford]